本研究認為影響「透過一般仲介搜尋方式成交的房屋」與「法拍成交的房屋」兩者價格差異的因素，主要有以下兩類：(1)品質：房地產實體特徵如所在樓層、樓板面積、土地面積與區位等。(2)「市場機制」：包括市場風險（實證上使用「點交與否」、「空屋與否」來代表）、市場競爭程度（實證上使用「競標人數」來代表）。實證樣本係來自2001-2002年台北市2354筆法拍資料與1546筆仲介搜尋市場的成交資料。主要的研究發現如下：(1)在控制住宅實體品質一致下，法拍屋價格仍比仲介屋價格平均低約17.20%，可見「市場機制」變數是影響兩者價格差異的重要因素之一，特別是「競爭程度不足」的因素。(2)實證數據顯示：每一拍定個案中的平均競標人數為2.77人。當競標人數僅為1人時，法拍屋價格較搜尋市場折價15.99%。然而，隨著競標人數的增加，市場價差幅度會以邊際斜率漸減的非線性曲線型態，逼近市場價格；但超過6人以上時，折價縮小的效果就微幅降低了。

By analyzing the data of foreclosed and brokerage houses in Taipei from 2001-2002, we try to answer the question of "Does the competition affect the price discount?" and detect the following facts: (1) The average selling price for foreclosed houses in the bidding market was about 17.20% lower than that of the brokerage houses in the searching and bargaining market, with all other factors being equivalent. We propose that market mechanisms, such as exposed risk to buyers in purchasing foreclosed houses and the number of bidders, can better explain the deeper-discounted price; (2) the price discount discrepancy was only 15.99% if one bidder is involved and multiple bidders actually increased this discrepancy between the two markets. This implies that full information disclosure may increase the competition and reduce the price discount of foreclosed houses in court-oriented auction market.