自1993年辜汪會談兩岸簽訂四項協議以來，行政院與立法院常就兩岸協商和協議如何受到國會監督而多所爭議。行政部門認為立法院以《臺灣地區與大陸地區人民關係條例》概括授權其處理兩岸協商事宜，故兩岸協商若無涉修法和人民權利義務，則視同行政命令，僅須送交立法院查照。惟立法院認為兩岸協商及協議攸關重大社會經濟利益之分配，甚或涉及台灣前途未來，故應有周延的國會監督機制。本文介紹歐美監督涉外經貿協商之多重否決點機制，探討其運作原理，並據此思考在兩岸協商上立法院可能扮演之監督角色。本文認為一個良善的多重否決點監督機制，不但不會阻礙兩岸的協商談判和經貿合作，反而可以使得兩岸協商更加透明化，兩岸協議更具民主正當性。

Since 1993, there has been a serious dispute between the Executive Yuan and the Legislative Yuan (LY) regarding the role of legislative oversight and scrutiny of cross-strait economic and trade negotiations. On the one hand, the executive branch believes that the LY, by enacting the “cross-strait law,” has already delegated its power en mass to the executive with regards to cross-strait negotiations. Therefore, any resultant cross-strait agreements are to be regarded as executive orders, subject only to notification of the LY. On the other hand, the LY believes that cross-strait agreements usually involve distributions of social-economic interests, some of which would even have implications of Taiwan’s future. For that reason, proper legislative oversight of cross-strait negotiations cannot be compromised. In this article, I introduce a mechanism of multiple veto points, widely practiced by the US and the EU in their trade negotiations, while examining its incentive structure. I suggest that a properly designed veto-point mechanism will not obstruct cross-strait negotiation and cooperation; to some extent, it will enhance transparency of negotiation processes and confer democratic legitimacy to cross-strait agreements.