多瑪斯將人的行為（或行動）區分為二類：一為專屬人的「人性行為」，此為哲學倫理學的基本議題；一為屬於人和動物共有的「情」或「情感」，此與倫理學、倫理教育亦息息相關。按照多瑪斯，靈魂之情之本性在於感性慾望部分，靈魂之情可區分為貪情／慾情和憤情二種。貪情／慾情方面主要包括三對情，即：愛與（怨）恨、慾望與逃避、快樂與傷痛／哀愁。憤情方面主要包括企望與失望、畏懼與勇猛，以及忿怒；忿怒沒有與之對立者。所以，類別不同之情共有十一種，六種屬於慾情方面，五種屬於憤情方面。這十一種情，包括了人之靈魂所有的情。其中，快樂、哀愁、企望及畏懼為四種主要之情。情本身並無道德性的善惡，然而已發之情受到理智和意志之命令，即與道德性的善惡相關，也因此靈魂之情能夠作為人類德行的主體。

Thomas Aquinas divided human acts into two categories: first, the ”human acts,” which are acts peculiar to men and the fundamental issues of philosophical ethics; and second, ”passions” common to human beings and animals, which are closely related to ethics and ethical education. For Aquinas, the nature of the soul's passions is about the sensitive appetites, as the passions of the soul can be categorized into the passions of the irascible appetites and the passions of the concupiscible appetites. The passions of the irascible appetites is composed of three pairs of passions: love and hatred, concupiscence and aversion, delight and sorrow. Regarding the passions of the concupiscible appetites, they consist largely of hope and despair, fear and daring, along with anger, which has no contrary passion. Therefore, there are eleven different passions while six of them belong to the concupiscible faculty and the other five to the irascible faculty. All passions of the soul are contained in these eleven passions, among which delight, sorrow, hope and fear are the cardinal ones. There is no moral good or evil in passions if they are considered by themselves. And yet if they are considered subject to the command of intellect and will, there is moral good and evil in them; therefore, the passions of the soul can be the subject of human virtue.