In the 1920s civil wars and disorder on the upper Yangtze made Szechuan a province where unruly soldiers and wayward bandits dominated. Neither the central government in Peking nor local authorities in Szechuan intended to or was able to protect foreign interests. Thus the U.S. Navy had no choice but to assume responsibility for maintaining shipping security to shield American interests and prestige. However, the U.S. Navy faced the dilemma of not being able to interfere in Chinese internal affairs or resorting to use of force when carrying out its patrolling and convoy missions. This paper finds that U.S. foreign policy towards China possessed contradictory characteristics: on one hand, U.S. policy was idealistic as it focused on respecting the independence and integrity of Chinese sovereignty; while on the other hand, realism came to the fore as the U.S. sought to expand and defend American business interests. The U.S. Navy's responses and operations on the upper Yangtze is an obvious exhibition of this kind of wavering between idealism and realism.