在2012年總統大選之後，民進黨看來站在十字路口當中。面對海峽兩岸越益增加的互動與希望看到兩岸關係穩定的多數選民，它的歷史以及做為台灣最悠久的獨立政黨之身分，似乎已成為追求勝選的負擔。可以這麼說，大多的台灣人現在至少可以接受「一個中國，各自表述」的「九二共識」。由此，一些黨的領導人與顧問表達了民進黨必須調整它的中國途徑以容納「九二共識」與「一個中國原則」。其他人則拒絕這種說法，反而訴求從基層重建政黨，重啟它與民間社會的連結以及振興活化民進黨的民主價值。本文重建民進黨自從2008年政黨輪替後的中國政策。本文論道，民進黨從當年的挫敗「學習不少」，並主要地導致了策略的機動，而在2012年大選前期緩和了馬英九親中政策的效果。接著本文聚焦於民進黨因2012年選舉結果而無法避免的後果，也就是當前對政黨的中國政策的辯論，定出一種替代途徑的空間界線與衡量在政黨領導中是否可能有一種新的「實用主義者共識」正在興起。

Following the 2012 presidential elections, the DPP seems to stand at a crossroads. Facing intensifying interaction across the Taiwan Strait and a majority of voters who want to see stable cross-strait relations, its history and identity as Taiwan’s oldest independence party seems to have become a burden for electoral success. Arguably, most Taiwanese can now at least live with the ‘1992 consensus’ of “one China with different interpretations”. It is hence stated by a number of party leaders and advisors that the DPP must modify its China approach to accommodate the ‘1992 consensus’ and the ‘One China principle’. Others reject this and instead plead for a rebuilding of the party from the grassroots, reactivating its links with civil society and rejuvenating the DPP’s democratic values. This article reconstructs the DPP’s China policy since the change in ruling parties in 2008. It argues that the DPP “learned little” from its defeat in that year and mainly conducted strategic maneuvering in the run-up to the 2012 elections to neutralize Ma Ying-jeou’s pro-active China policy. The article then focuses on the current debate in the DPP on the necessary consequences of the 2012 election outcome for the party’s China policy, demarcating the space for an alternative approach and pondering if there might be a new ‘pragmatist consensus’ rising in the party leadership.