為避免公司董事追求自身利益而犧牲公司整體利益，並憑藉其職權侵害股東、債權人以及投資人之利益，各國公司法規均課與公司董事一定程度之義務，使其能夠謹慎執行職務，並透過民事責任制度使被害人之損害能夠獲得填補。法律強化董事之義務與責任之目的無非係為促使公司董事更謹慎執行職務，並防止其濫用權利損害公司、股東及社會大眾的利益，進而提升公司的經營績效。近年來，我國陸續修正公司法、證券交易法、證券投資人及期貨交易人保護法等法規，一方面強化公司董事之義務與責任，另一方面亦完備相關訴訟制度，可以預見未來實務上公司董事違反法律課與之義務而被追訴責任的案例將日益增多。董事責任之加重固然具有防弊之功能，但此責任之加重亦可能使董事唯恐因職務之執行，而有負民刑事責任之虞，進而導致董事以保守的態度執行職務或拒絕接受董事職務之負面效果。因此，我國在強化公司董事責任之際，亦應思考設計出一套相對應的責任風險移轉機制，以平衡董事之權利義務。英美兩國為防止公司董事過重的責任所可能造成的負面效果，乃發展出一系列的董事責任風險移轉機制，以期在公司董事之權利義務間尋求一個適當的平衡點。其中，英美兩國公司法制允許公司對董事在符合一定條件下，對其責任給予適當的限制或免除，使董事之責任額度與其所獲得之報酬立於適當的比例。我國公司法制在致力於董事義務及責任之健全與強化的同時，亦不應忽略英美公司法學中有關董事責任限制與免除之規定。如此方能於防弊之餘，同時鼓勵公司董事勇於任事並為公司興利。職是之故，本文將針對英美兩國公司法制中有關董事責任限制與免除之規範內容與實務運作情形進行探討，並比較英美兩國相關制度規範上之差異，進而分析我國引進此一制度的可能性以及相關的法律設計，以期對我國公司董事責任法制之建構與發展，有所助益。

For the purpose of preventing directors from self-interested actions, almost every country imposes duties upon corporate directors under its company law. In the past few years, the Taiwanese government has amended the Company Act, the Securities and Exchange Act and the Securities Investor and Futures Trader Protection Act to enhance corporate directors' liability and to perfect the legal system of relevant lawsuits. Although the enhancement of corporate directors' liability may enable corporate directors to exercise proper care in managing the company's affairs and prevent corporate directors from exploiting their corporate powers for their own benefit, some individuals faced with the proliferation of potential liability may determine that the risks of office outweigh the benefits and decide not to serve as corporate directors or manage the company's affairs passively. Therefore, the establishment of a mechanism that corporate directors should, in the absence of certain conduct, be free from perso nal liability for corporate acts is required while enhancing corporate directors' liability. In order to prevent the negative impact of extra-legal liability on corporate directors, both the U.K. and U.S. have developed a series of relief mechanisms of corporate directors' liability. In particular, the U.S. and British company laws allow a company to limit or to eliminate their directors' liability. The regulation of limitation and elimination of director liability in the U.S. and the U.K. which serves as an incentive to encourage corporate directors to act for the best interests of the company should not be ignored, while enhancing corporate directors' liability under Taiwan's company law. Accordingly, this article will explore the regulation of limitation and elimination of director liability in the U.S. and U.K. and their practices. Then, it will compare the difference of regulatory frameworks between the U.S. and the U.K. Further, this article will analyze the feasibility of introducing limitation and elimination of director liability into Taiwan. If the introduction of limiting and eli minating director liability into Taiwan is practicable, this article will further offer its regulatory design.