作為國家資本主義的典型代表區域，拉丁美洲在這二十多年間發生不少政府介入市場的行為，尤其表現在外資的強制徵收上。本文探究拉丁美洲國家外資徵收的原因，並特別關注國內政治及制度的影響。國家資本主義的一項特色在於，政府介入經濟活動是為了達到其政治目的，本文認為此政治目的即是國家領導者要鞏固其統治權力。奠基於理性選擇理論與政治生存的概念，本文認為當領導者面對較大的制度限制時，愈可能採取徵收外資的手段。此外，根據既有關於外資徵收的理論，非民主國家和石油盛產國比較有可能徵收外資。為驗證上述研究假設，本文使用1980年至2008年拉丁美洲18個國家外資徵收的資料，以多層次卜瓦松模型和多層次二元勝算對數模型進行統計分析。分析結果顯示，當領導者受到的制度限制程度愈高，徵收愈可能發生，此外，民主國家較不易徵收外資，而石油產量高的國家較易徵收外資。本文亦討論委內瑞拉和巴西兩個個案，發現對總統的行政限制造成了兩國徵收政策的不同，此個案討論同樣驗證本文的理論。

This article focuses on state capitalism in Latin America and examines what causes the expropriation of foreign direct investment (FDI) in this region. We argue that leaders' concerns over their political survival affect FDI expropriation in Latin American countries. Specifically, when leaders sense a higher level of political constraints and political insecurity, they are more likely to take unilateral action, i.e., by expropriating FDI. This argument illustrates one important feature of state capitalism: governments utilize markets to serve political goals. We conduct a data analysis of expropriation in 18 Latin American countries from 1980 to 2008, and the results show that leaders are more likely to expropriate when they confront stronger executive constraints. The results also confirm the findings in the literature that democratic regimes expropriate less and that oil-producing countries expropriate more. The focus on Venezuela and Brazil also supports our main argument.