In the article I examine Benjamin Constant's ideas of liberty, equality and constitutional democracy. Constant is celebrated for his contrast of “the liberty of the ancients” and “the liberty of the moderns,” with a seeming praise for the latter and doubt of the former. Close reading reveals, however, that Constant is as affirmative to “positive liberty” as to “negative liberty.” His concept of equality also displays an ambiguous spirit: the equality of political rights is compatible with the inequality of wealth and property, though in the long run human beings are destined to live in a condition of general equality. In the issue of constitutionalism, Constant criticizes Rousseau's idea of unlimited sovereignty and Hobbes' absolute power, arguing that the only way to safeguard civil rights is separation of powers and representative democracy. Last, I point out in what sense Constant's liberalism can throw light on the weakness of contemporary liberalism, at least in regard to the question of universality, neutrality and patriotism.