本文旨在探討全民健康保險的實施，對因應醫療支出的不確定所為之個人儲蓄的影響。不同於相關文獻之部份均衡分析，本文考慮要素價格的內生決定。此外，本文亦檢視當儲蓄與勞動供給同為個人決策時，健康保險對儲蓄的衝擊有無差異。主要結論是，在既定的要素價格下，無論勞動供給量是固定或內生決定，開辦全民健康保險，都將造成風險趨避的個人之儲蓄減少。而在已實施的情況下，基於保險財務平衡的原則而調高給付比率，如勞動供給內生決定，則其對儲蓄的影響並不明確。惟若考慮要素價格變動的反饋效果，且如果個人的絕對風險趨避值遞減，則全民健康保險的提供有抑制儲蓄的作用。

　　　　　This paper examines the overall effect of national health insurance on the precautionary savings due to uncertain and potentially large medical expenses. Recognizing that an insurance policy may have a significant effect on factor price, we propose a theoretical framework which incorporates both the national health insurance program and the supply side factocs so that we can evaluate the overall effect. We also allow the labor supply to be endogenous. The major result of this paper is that, given for factor prices, the provision of national health insurance discourages savings if individuals are risk-averse. Moreover, if the individual's risk aversion function is decreasing, the overall effect of lowering the coinsurance rate given a balanced-budget constraint is to discourage savings.