在傳統哲學中，知識論（epistemology）的主要課題是討論有關知識的來源、性質、範圍等問題。而當代討論知識論的議題則集中於對知識（knowledge）和信念的證成（justification of belief）的研究上。波洛克（John L. Pollock）就說過： 　　知識論企圖對「你如何知道？」這個問題提出答案。這是個有關一個人如何知道，而不是有關知道本身的問題。在問一個人知道什麼時，我們通常會要求他提供他的信念的理由根據。我們要知道他持有此信念的憑據（證成justification）是什麼？因此知識論在傳統上比較強調證成而非知識。 認知的證成是一個規範的概念，它告訴我們應相信什麼，或不應相信什麼。（Pollock, 1986, p.7） 然而最近幾十年來，對知識論採取自然化的取徑相當的流行。它不是問我們應該如何用資料來證成我們的信念，不問我們如何用證據來支持我們的科學；而是問：在事實上我們如何由資料形成信念。這是一種不問證成的問題而問發生的（genetic）、因果的（causal）問題的事實研究。Willard Van Quine就認為這是屬於自科學的探究的範圍。這就是所謂的自然化的知識論。

　　　　　Some feminists assume that there are distinctively female ways of knowing, and the oppressed, marginalized people (unquestionably including women) are epistemically privileged. Therefore there should be a different women's epistemology. The first part of this essay summarizes some important assumptions and the content of "Feminist Epistemology", while in the second part we argue that there are no reasons to consider these assumptions are warranted, and because of these assumptions the feminist epistemology is even self-defeating. We also point out that another theoretical difficulty of feminist epistemology, the "bias paradox", was not successfully solved by Louise M. Antony, therefore, we conclude that the feminist epistemology is incongruous and not a legitimate subfield of analytic philosophy.