研究了由一個制造商和一個零售商組成的綠色供應鏈和他們的需求預測信息共享問題。考慮了兩種方案:訂貨型生產方案和庫存型生產方案,兩種方案下分別考慮了無信息共享和信息共享兩種情況。分析了預測信息對兩種方案下制造商利潤、零售商利潤和信息共享價值的影響,同時研究了綠色成本系數對信息共享的影響。研究表明,兩種方案中制造商始終能從信息共享中獲利,而零售商只有在制造商綠色成本系數較低時才會自愿共享預測信息。當綠色成本系數較高時,制造商可以通過一個討價還價合同,促進零售商進行信息共享。當綠色成本系數很高時,供應鏈成員之間不存在信息共享。此外,庫存型生產方案中信息共享帶來的總收益增量要高于訂貨型生產方案,因此,庫存型生產方案中參與者信息共享的可能性要高于訂貨型生產方案。

Due to the rapid changes in business environment,it is difficult for green supply chain members to make accurate decisions in the face of highly uncertain market conditions.However,supply chain members can forecast uncertain market demand based on past sales data.Given this background,aproblem of information sharing under asymmetric demand forecasting in green supply chain is studied.Two scenarios are investigated:the"make-to-order"scenario and the"make-to-stock"scenario,considering two situations:with information sharing and without information sharing.The optimal decision and optimal expected profit of the manufacturers and retailers in several cases are obtained.Through the comparison of the optimal expected profits,it is found the value of information sharing and a bargaining mechanism can coordinate the supply chain.The research shows thatmanufacturers are always profitable from information sharing in both scenarios.Unlike previous studies,retailers can also benefit from information sharing when the green cost factor is low.When the green cost factor is high,manufacturers can promote retailers to share information through a bargaining contract.Additionally,when the green cost factor is high,there is no information sharing between members of the green supply chain.Furthermore,the increase of total revenue brought by information sharing in"make-to-stock"scenario is higher than that of the total revenue in"make-to-order"scenario.Therefore,the possibility of participant information sharing in the"make-to-stock"scenario is higher than that of the"make-to-order"scenario.Finally,the sensitivity analysis of some parameters influences the accuracy and correlation of the forecast information on the profit of the manufacturer,the value of the manufacturer’s information sharing,and the value of the information sharing of the supply chain.