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題名:公司治理與公司價值─中國大陸證券市場之實證研究
作者:邱秀清
作者(外文):CHIU, HSIU-CHING
校院名稱:中國文化大學
系所名稱:國際企業管理研究所
指導教授:謝安田
薛富井
學位類別:博士
出版日期:2002
主題關鍵詞:公司治理公司價值中國大陸Corporate GovernanceCorporate ValueMainland China
原始連結:連回原系統網址new window
相關次數:
  • 被引用次數被引用次數:期刊(2) 博士論文(3) 專書(0) 專書論文(0)
  • 排除自我引用排除自我引用:2
  • 共同引用共同引用:0
  • 點閱點閱:164
本研究旨在探討公司治理(corporate governance)與公司價值之關係,主要針對中國大陸證券市場上市公司之特性,並經由文獻之引用及邏輯之推理,發現在中國大陸證券市場上市公司兩者之關係是否有其特殊性,必要作進一步釐清。
本研究抽樣期間為1999至2001年的資料,樣本為深圳證券交易所的上市公司,其中包括1999年扣除資料不齊全公司後共425家公司、2000年扣除資料不齊全公司後共458家、及2001年(至2002年8月底止已發布年報上市公司)在扣除資料不齊全公司後共302家。本研究變數資料取自中國大陸深圳交易所上市公司發布之年報資料及台灣經濟新報社根據中國大陸深圳交易所上市公司發布之財務報表彙整而得。
研究結果發現:(1)國家持股比率與公司價值呈現負向關係並不顯著。(2)法人持股比率與公司價值呈現正向關係。(3)國家超過法人持股比率與公司價值呈現負向關係。(4)外資持股比率與公司價值呈現正向關係,僅市場價值指標顯著。(5)股權集中度與公司價值呈現負向關係,僅會計報酬指標顯著。(6)董事會規模與公司價值呈現正向關係。(7)監事會規模與公司價值呈現正向關係並不顯著。(8)是否有獨立董事席次與公司價值呈現正向關係,僅市場價值指標之個別迴歸實證結果顯著。(9)董事長兼任總經理與公司價值呈現正向關係並不顯著。
This study was intended to examine the relationship between corporate governance and corporate value. I chose the stock market and the listed corporations in Mainland China as the empirical research setting. Drawing upon the corporate governance litera-ture, this study was focused on exploring the unique characteristics of the linkage be-tween corporate governance and corporate value in Chinese corporations. Theoretical arguments were proposed to explain this uniqueness.
The sampling frame consisted of the shareholding corporations listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange over the period of 1999 to 2001. After deleting corporations with missing data, the final sample included 425 corporations in 1999, 458 corporations in 2000, and 302 corporations in 2001. The data were collected from two sources: (1) annual reports of the listed corporations disclosed in the publications of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange; and (2) financial data about Chinese corporations compiled by Taiwan Economic Journal.
The major findings are summarized as follows: (1) There was little evidence sup-porting a negative relationship between the proportion of state-owned shares and cor-porate value; (2) There was a positive relationship between the proportion of le-gal-person (LP) shares and corporate value; (3) Corporate value increased with the de-gree of relative dominance of LP shares over state-owned shares; (4) There was a posi-tive relationship between the proportion of foreign-investor-owned shared and corporate value, but this relationship was identified only with respect to market value indicator; (5) Ownership concentration ratios was negatively associated with corporate value on ac-counting indicator; (6) Corporate value was positively related to the size of the board of directors; (7) No significant relationship was found between corporate value and the size of the supervisory board; (8) A positive relationship between corporate value and the presence of independent directors was found only when market value indicators were used; and (9) There was little evidence in support of a positive relationship be-tween corporate value and CEO duality.
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