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題名：董監事股權質押的代理問題與公司價值關聯性之研究
作者：劉綠萍
作者(外文)：Liu,Lu-Ping
校院名稱：國立臺北大學
系所名稱：企業管理學系
指導教授：古永嘉
學位類別：博士
出版日期：2003
主題關鍵詞：股權質押；公司價值；監督機制；Controlling shareholders；Corporation value；Monitoring mechanisms
原始連結：連回原系統網址new window
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本論文的研究目的係探討董監事持股質押之代理問題對公司價值之影響，並考量公司治理機制是否可以降低因董監事持股質押所引發之代理衝突，再進一步從公司治理的角度，探討來自於機構投資人的監督、來自於債權人的監督以及股利政策等三個控制機制，能否有效降低董監事股權質押之代理問題對公司價值的影響。
本研究以民國八十七年至九十一年間有公開財務資料之上市公司為研究對象，因考量金融保險業之營業性質與財務結構較為特殊，與其他產業相距甚鉅，故予以排除後之樣本為研究對象，以複迴歸分析法進行實證。
研究結果發現，董監事持股質押加劇了控制股東與外部股東之間的代理衝突問題，也發現董監事持股質押對公司價值具有顯著性的負面效果。
如果將樣本再區分為集團公司與非集團公司兩群樣本，則發現董監事持股質押與公司經營績效在集團公司中係呈現負向之相關，但在非集團公司中兩者的關係則不顯著；顯示在集團公司中董監事持股質押所帶來的代理問題更甚於非集團公司。
本論文的結果支持機構投資人、債權人及股利政策等三項公司監督機制，能有效降低董監事持股質押所引發的代理問題，進而改善公司之經營績效。實證結果也發現，當公司機構投資人的持股比率愈高、負債比率愈高，以及股利率愈高時，董監事持股質押比率對財務績效的負面影響愈小。此外，董監事持股質押所引發的代理問題在集團公司會較非集團公司嚴重，因此上述三項監督機制對於集團公司之降低代理問題所產生的利益顯著於非集團公司。
The purposes of this paper are to examine the agency problem due to collateralized shares and the relationship between pledged shares of directors and corporate value in Taiwan stock market. I further investigate whether monitoring mechanisms including institutional investors, creditors and dividend policy can alleviate the agency problem due to shares as collateral by board of directors.
The research data are collected from the publications of those companies that stocks are openly traded on the Taiwan Stock Market between 1998 and 2002.
The paper indicates that there is an inverse relationship between shares as collateral and corporation value. When the entire sample is divided into a subsample of conglomerate firms and a subsample of non-conglomerate firms, I further show that the inverse relationship exists only in conglomerate firms. The findings imply that agency problems resulting from shares as collateral by board of directors are more serious in conglomerate firms than in non-conglomerate firms.
The paper provides evidence that the monitoring from institutional investors, creditors and dividend policy can reduce the agency problems of shares as collateral effectively and thus can improve corporation value. Empirical findings indicate that institutional holdings, debt ration and dividend payout ratio can mitigate the negative effect of agency problems on corporation value. In addition, monitoring mechanisms are more beneficial in conglomerate firms than in non-conglomerate firms
一、中文部分
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9. 高蘭芬，董監事股權質押之代理問題對會計資訊與公司績效之影響，國立成功大學會計研究所未出版博士論文，民國91年。new window
10. 翁淑育，台灣上市公司股權結構、核心代理問題及公司價值之研究，輔仁大學金融研究所碩士論文，民國89年。
11. 許加昂，董監質押比率與公司經營績效、融資政策、股利政策關聯性之研究，台灣大學會計學研究所未出版碩士論文，民國89年。
12. 許盟，我國董事會結構與自願性盈餘預測行為之研究，國立政治大學會計研究所未出版碩士論文，民國89年。
13. 曹瓊芳，集團企業與盈餘操縱關聯性之研究，東吳大學會計學系碩士班未出版碩士論文，民國88年。
14. 陳宏姿，董監事結構與企業財務績效關聯之研究，政治大學會計學研究所未出版碩士論文，民國90年。
15. 楊麗弘，台灣上市公司股權結構與經營績效研究---由董監事持股質押效果論之，長庚大學管理學研究所未出版碩士論文，民國89年。
16. 葉銀華與邱顯比，「資本結構、股權結構與公司價值關聯性之實證研究：代理理論」，台大管理論叢，第七卷第二期，民國85年，頁57-89。
17. 蕭天厚，企業財務危機因素認知之研究-從公司監理角度之研究，國立臺灣大學會計學研究所未出版碩士論文，民國89年。
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