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題名：公司治理與國際化
作者：陳俞如 引用關係
作者(外文)：Yu-ju Chen
校院名稱：國立雲林科技大學
系所名稱：管理研究所博士班
指導教授：陳燕錫
金成隆
學位類別：博士
出版日期：2007
主題關鍵詞：公司治理；國際化；盈餘品質；earnings quality；internationalization；corporate governance
原始連結：連回原系統網址new window
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本文分成三個主題，分別探討公司治理、外資、盈餘反應係數和國際化的關係，由於台灣上市公司為提升公司績效，因此國際化的現象非常普遍，然而缺乏相關文獻探討國際化和公司治理、會計議題之間的關連，因而本文延伸出三個有關治理、會計和國際化關係的研究。並分別敘述三篇的摘要。
第一篇為公司治理和國際化的議題。由於許多研究證實在控制權集中的公司，控制股東會透過金字塔結構或參與管理的方式增加控制權，剝削小股東的利益，進而降低公司財富。除了控制股東透過各種方式直接或間接的剝奪小股東利益外，本研究進一步分析控制股東是否會影響公司國際化的策略訂定。本研究使用控制股東控制權和現金流量權偏離大小和控制股東的質押比例代理公司治理風險，實證發現，控制股東控制權和現金流量權偏離程度愈大，以及控制股東質押比例愈高，公司國際化的程度愈低，此外，研究也發現，當控制股東同時為董事長、總經理或所佔董事時，隨著控制股東控制權和現金流量權偏離程度愈大，或控制股東質押比例愈高，造成公司國際化程度降低的情
第二篇主要針對外資對國際化的影響做討論。由於外資在台灣經濟發展扮演著非重要的角色，外資持股比例愈高，意謂著外資對公司策略有著重大的影響力，可帶給本國公司進行國際化許多實質上有益的助力，本文以台灣上市公司為樣本，以海外資產比例、海外子公司數和營運所跨越的國家數代理國際化程度，實證發現當公司外資持股比例愈高、海外董事比例愈高，公司的國際化程度都愈高，顯示外資的海外經驗及資源確實對公司國際化有助益。
第三篇在探討公司國際化對公司海外盈餘反應係數(ERC)之影響。台灣企業為了具有更高的競爭優勢，積極地向海外擴張，使國際化程度日益提高，而國際化是企業成長的重要策略，但也會使公司面臨較高的不確定性，因此國際化對公司的ERC可能具有正負二方向的影響，造成公司有不同的ERC。研究發現，採涉入程度較高的國際化策略(直接至海外投資)會降低公司的ERC，也就是以海外投資資產比例、企業海外子公司所跨越的國家數、海外子公司數代理國際化時，國際化程度度愈高，公司ERC愈小。此外，本文也發現公司可藉由健全公司治理或至法規保障較佳的國家投資，加強投資者對公司經營策略的信賴，以降低國際化損壞盈餘品質的情形。
This dissertation consists of three parts of research topics, linking accounting and managerial issues, such as corporate governance, foreign ownership and earnings response coefficient (ERC) to corporate internationalization. Corporate internationalization is prevalent widely among Taiwanese companies. Many companies seek to expand into foreign countries to enhance corporate performance. However, a paucity of literature has directed attention to corporate internationalization from corporate governance and accounting perspectives. In this dissertation, three accounting and governance topics in relation to corporate internationalization are discussed.
The first paper, titled as “Corporate Governance and Internationalization” investigates how corporate governance influences internationalization based on agency theory. The findings suggest that large divergence between the controlling rights and the cash flow rights and the controlling owners’ stock pledge ratio will significantly have negative effects on corporate internationalization. Moreover, when the divergence of the controlling rights to the cash flow rights escalates, or the pledge ratio rises, the controlling owners act as the chairpersons of the boards or the general managers would have negative effects on the degree of corporate internationalization.
The second paper, titled as “Foreign Ownership and Internationalization” explores how foreign ownership influences corporate internationalization. The findings suggest that foreign ownership and foreign director has positive association with e higher degree of corporate internationalization. Foreign investors have international experiences and linkages which foster domestic companies to engage in internationalizing activities.
The final paper, titled as “Controlling the controllers: The impact of legal protections and corporate governance structures on Investor Reactions to International Earnings” investigates how legal protections and corporate governance influence investors to react international earnings. The findings suggest that direct foreign investments will decrease overseas ERC. In addition, companies can reduce the negative effects of internationalization on foreign earnings response coefficient through enhancing their corporate governance or investing in countries where they have better law protection environment. The rest of the dissertation will comprehensively explore these three research topics in the following sections, respectively.
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