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題名：公司投資決策之實證研究
作者：何柏欣 引用關係
作者(外文)：Po-Hsin Ho
校院名稱：國立臺灣大學
系所名稱：財務金融學研究所
指導教授：何耕宇
陳聖賢
學位類別：博士
出版日期：2011
主題關鍵詞：究與發展費用；過度自信經理人；長期表現；合併與收購；公司治理；R&；D Expenditure；CEO overconfidence；Long-run Performance；Merge and Acquisition；Corporate Governance
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本論文是由兩篇公司投資決策實證研究之文章所搆成。
在第一篇文章中，我們研究過度自信經理人與研發費用大幅增加之間的關連性。 過去的研究指出當公司研發支出大幅增加時，不論長、短期股價反應皆為正向。 本研究說明這樣的正向長期股價反應只發生在沒有過度自信經理人的公司；同時我們也發現只有當公司的經理人不過度自信時，研發費用大幅增加才會對公司長期營收帶來好處。我們認為會造成這樣的結果是由於過度自信經理人往往會過度投資且會高估投資計畫的未來現金流量。是故，過度自信經理人可能會投資價值減損的研發計畫。
在第二篇文章中，我們探討當公司從事績效不佳的購併案時，其後續的公司治理結構是否會有變化；我們以公司宣告購併案時股價大幅滑落做為績效不佳購併案的標準。過去研究已指出不良的公司治理結構會造成不好的購併績效，而本文從動態的觀點探討公司進行不好的購併案後的公司治理結構如何進行調整，以及公司治理機制改變後的長期績效之變化，我們發現公司從事不佳的購併計畫後確實會進行公司治理結構的調整，特別是在增加獨立董事席次、董事會獨立性以及審計委員會席次與審計委員會的獨立董事席次方面。本研究同時發現公司進行績效不佳購併案後，有改善治理結構的公司長期股票績效比沒有改善的公司來得好，因此，本研究認為改善治理結構可以幫助公司來挽回股東與投資人的信心。
This dissertation contains two essays on corporate investment decision.
Essay 1: CEO Overconfidence and the Long-Term Performance Following R&D Increases
In this essay, we set out in this study to examine the relationship between the CEO overconfidence and significant increases in research and development (R&D) expenditure. Although the prior studies reveal a significantly positive market reaction to both short- and long-run following the increases in R&D expenditure, our empirical results indicate that long-run stock performance is found to be positive only for those firms whose CEOs are not overconfident. We also provide evidence to show that an unexpected increase in R&D expenditure is an investment decision which is again only beneficial for firms whose CEOs do not exhibit overconfidence. Our findings, which may be attributable to both overinvestment and the overestimation of future cash flows, indicate that overconfident behavior often leads to the pursuit of value-destroying R&D investment projects.
Essay 2: The Change of Corporate Governance Mechanism Following Bad Acquisitions
In this essay, we investigate the changes in corporate governance mechanism following bad acquisitions. A merger is defined as a bad acquisition if the share price declines significantly around the merger announcement date. Numerous research indicates that weak corporate governance lead to lower merger announcement effect. We examine firms'' response following bad acquisition from the dynamic perspective and estimate the long-run performance associated with the change of the governance variables. Our results suggest that after bad acquisition, firms'' corporate governance structure indeed change, especially for the increase in the independent directors, board independence, and independent audit committee members. Our evidence indicates that firm would improve the weak governance structure to restore the trust of shareholders and investors. Our results also show that the post-merger long-run abnormal performance associated with the increasing of number of directors, independent directors, and the number of directors in audit committee mechanism is significantly positive, but the abnormal operating performance are not related to the changes in governance variables. The results suggest that bad acquiring firms which improve their governance restore the trust from investors.
Essay 1:
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Essay 2:
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