臺灣人文及社會科學引文索引資料庫系統

:::

詳目顯示

回上一頁
第 1 筆 / 總合 1 筆   第一頁 上一頁 下一頁 最後一頁
/1頁
題名：家族所有權、經營權、控制權對集團企業經營績效與創新之影響
作者：莊皓鈞
作者(外文)：Chuang, Hao Jun
校院名稱：國立政治大學
系所名稱：科技管理與智慧財產研究所
指導教授：溫肇東
沈榮欽
學位類別：博士
出版日期：2015
主題關鍵詞：家族企業；所有權結構；公司治理；企業績效；創新策略；Family business；ownership structures；corporate governance；firm performance；innovation strategies
原始連結：連回原系統網址new window
相關次數：
  • 被引用次數被引用次數:期刊(0) 博士論文(0) 專書(0) 專書論文(0)
  • 排除自我引用排除自我引用:0
  • 共同引用共同引用:0
  • 點閱點閱:3
從企業績效來看，在需持續創新、風險與產業技術複雜性較高的電子業，家族企業若聘用專業經理人經營，企業績效較差，反之，在產業技術變化性與風險較低的傳統產業，家族企業聘用專業經理人經營，反而企業績效較佳，這顯示，在面臨高度風險的環境時，家族企業中經營權與所有權的分離才會導致代理問題。同樣地，在電子業中，家族企業的控制權與所有權分離程度越高，企業績效越差，反之，在傳統產業中，家族企業控制權與所有權分離程度越高，企業績效反而越佳。這個結果顯示，在需持續創新、風險與產業技術複雜性較高的產業中，家族企業必須同時面臨兩種代理問題。
從企業對創新這類風險性投資的策略來看，本論文的研究結果顯示，經營權與所有權合一，企業所有者有能力及意願監督經營者，這將有助於企業投入較多的創新。反之，在控制權與所有權分離的情況下，因為投資的大部分是其他人的錢，企業的最終控制者能將創新的風險分散給外部股東，而較有意願投入創新。而家族控制者本身，因其規避風險的特質，而對上述兩類對創新有正向影響的治理機制有負向的調節效果（moderate）。但對家族成員而言，創新有助於企業的長期競爭優勢為了家族的永續發展，在經營企業上應該會採取長遠觀點（long-term perspective），而有意願投入創新，為了解開這個難題，本研究進一步將創新分為利用型創新（exploitative innovation）及開創型創新（explorative innovation）兩類，分析結果發現，家族企業雖然投入創新的數目較少，但在比例上有較多是較開創的創新，這個結果顯示，家族企業雖然害怕風險，但相對於非家族企業仍較具有長期經營的觀點並較具開創性。
This dissertation concerns the effects of different governance structures on firms’ performance and innovativeness in business groups.
In the first study, the ambivalent needs of control and growth of family firms in business group are explored. This study finds that in general, the excess control rights and controlling shareholdings will increase firms’ performance. In addition, family firms with such control structures will perform better in non-electronic industry while worse in electronic industry. Lastly, active control, namely family members control management and chairman at the same time, will perform better in electronic industry while worse in non-electronic industry.
The second study focuses on comparing family and non-family group affiliated firms’ incentives to do innovations in different governance structures. Adopting behavior agent model, we propose that although family group affiliated firms are less innovativeness than non-family group affiliated firms in general, they have larger share of exploratory innovation than non-family firms. The empirical results support our hypotheses. However, in contrast to traditional agency perspective, the separations between ownership and control rights facilitate firms’ innovativeness. This finding may originate in pyramid ownership structure.
Admati, A. R., Pfleiderer, P., &; Zechner, J. 1994. Large Shareholder Activism, Risk Sharing, and Financial Market Equilibrium. Journal of Political Economy, 102(6): 1097-1130.
Agrawal, A. &; Knoeber, C. R. 1996. Firm performance and mechanisms to control agency problems between managers and shareholders. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 31(3): 377-397.
Almeida, H. V. &; Wolfenzon, D. 2006. A theory of pyramidal ownership and family business groups. Journal of Finance, 61(6): 2637-2680.
Anderson, R. C. &; Reeb, D. M. 2003. Founding-family ownership and firm performance: Evidence from the S&;P 500. Journal of Finance, 58(3): 1301-1328.
Anderson, R. C., Duru, A., &; Reeb, D. M. 2012. Investment policy in family controlled fims. Journal of Banking &; Finance, 36(6): 1744-1758.
Arregle, J. L., Hitt, M. A., Sirmon, D. G., &; Very, P. 2007. The development of organizational social capital: Attributes of family firms. Journal of Management Studies, 44(1): 73-95.new window
Baltagi, B. H., Bresson, G., &; Pirotte, A. 2003. Fixed effects, random effects or Hausman-Taylor? A pretest estimator. Economics Letters, 79(3): 361-369.
Battaggion, M. R. &; L., T. 2001. Ownership Structure, Innovation Process and Competitive Performance: the Case of Italy. CESPRI Working Paper No. 120, Milano.
Baysinger, B. D., Kosnik, R. D., &; Turk, T. A. 1991. Effects of Board and Ownership Structure on Corporate Research-and-Development Strategy. Academy of Management Journal, 34(1): 205-214.new window
Bebchuk, L., Kraakman, R., &; Triantis, G. 2000. Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and Dual Class Equity: The Creation and Agency Costs of Separating Control From Cash-Flow Rights. In R. Morck (Ed.), Concentrated Corporate Ownership: 445-460.
Bebchuk, L. A. &; Cohen, A. 2005. The costs of entrenched boards. Journal of Financial Economics, 78(2): 409-433.
Belenzon, S. &; Berkovitz, T. 2010. Innovation in Business Groups. Management Science, 56(3): 519-535.
Belloc, F. 2012. Corporate Governance and Innovation: A Survey. Journal of Economic Surveys, 26(5): 835-864.
Benner, M. J. &; Tushman, M. 2002. Process management and technological innovation: A longitudinal study of the photography and paint industries. Administrative Science Quarterly, 47(4): 676-706.
Berger, P. G., Ofek, E., &; Yermack, D. L. 1997. Managerial entrenchment and capital structure decisions. Journal of Finance, 52(4): 1411-1438.
Berle, A. A. &; Means, G. C. 1932. The modern corporation and private property. New York: Macmillan.
Berrone, P., Cruz, C., Gomez-Mejia, L. R., &; Larraza-Kintana, M. 2010. Socioemotional Wealth and Corporate Responses to Institutional Pressures: Do Family-Controlled Firms Pollute Less? Administrative Science Quarterly, 55(1): 82-113.new window
Bertrand, M. &; Schoar, A. 2006. The role of family in family firms. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 20(2): 73-96.
Bourgeois, L. J. &; Eisenhardt, K. M. 1988. Strategic Decision-Processes in High-Velocity Environments - 4 Cases in the Microcomputer Industry. Management Science, 34(7): 816-835.
Boyd, B. 1990. Corporate Linkages and Organizational Environment - a Test of the Resource Dependence Model. Strategic Management Journal, 11(6): 419-430.
Boyd, B. K. 1995. Ceo Duality and Firm Performance - a Contingency-Model. Strategic Management Journal, 16(4): 301-312.
Brickley, J. A., Coles, J. L., &; Jarrell, G. 1997. Leadership structure: Separating the CEO and chairman of the board. Journal of Corporate Finance, 3(3): 189-220.
Chandler, A. D. 1977. The visible hand : the managerial revolution in American business. Cambridge, Mass. ; London: Harvard University Press.
Chandler, A. D. &; Hikino, T. 1990. Scale and scope : the dynamics of industrial capitalism. Cambridge, Mass. ; London: Belknap Press.
Chang, S. J. &; Hong, J. 2000. Economic performance of group-affiliated companies in Korea: Intragroup resource sharing and internal business transactions. Academy of Management Journal, 43(3): 429-448.
Chang, S. J. 2003. Ownership structure, expropriation, and performance of group-affiliated companies in Korea. Academy of Management Journal, 46(2): 238-253.
Chang, S. J., Chung, C. N., &; Mahmood, I. P. 2006. When and how does business group affiliation promote firm innovation? A tale of two emerging economies. Organization Science, 17(5): 637-656.
Chen, S., Chen, X., &; Cheng, Q. 2008. Do family firms provide more or less voluntary disclosure? Journal of Accounting Research, 46(3): 499-536.
Chrisman, J. J. &; Patel, P. C. 2011. Variations in R&;D Investments of Family and Non-family Firms: Behavioral Agency and Myopic Loss Aversion Perspectives. Academy of Management Journal, In Press.
Claessens, S., Djankov, S., &; Lang, L. H. P. 2000. The separation of ownership and control in East Asian Corporations. Journal of Financial Economics, 58(1-2): 81-112.
Claessens, S., Djankov, S., Fan, J. R. H., &; Lang, L. H. P. 2002. Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings. Journal of Finance, 57(6): 2741-2771.
Claessens, S., Fan, J. R. H., &; Lang, L. H. P. 2006. The benefits and costs of group affiliation: Evidence from East Asia. Emerging Markets Review, 7(1): 1-26.new window
Corstjens, M., Peyer, U. C., &; Van der Heyden, L. 2006. Performance of family firms : evidence from US and European firms and investors. INSEAD Working Paper.
Cubbin, J. &; Leech, D. 1983. The Effect of Shareholding Dispersion on the Degree of Control in British-Companies - Theory and Measurement. Economic Journal, 93(370): 351-369.
Dalton, D. R., Hitt, M. A., Certo, S. T., &; Dalton, C. M. 2007. The Fundamental Agency Problem and Its Mitigation: Independence, Equity, and the Market for Corporate Control. Academy of Management Annals, 1: 1-64.new window
Davis, J. H., Schoorman, F. D., &; Donaldson, L. 1997. Toward a stewardship theory of management. Academy of Management Review, 22(1): 20-47.new window
Deephouse, D. L. &; Jaskiewicz, P. 2013. Do Family Firms Have Better Reputations Than Non-Family Firms? An Integration of Socioemotional Wealth and Social Identity Theories. Journal of Management Studies, 50(3): 337-360.
Dyer, W. G. 2006. Examining the "family effect" on firm performance. Family Business Review, 19(4): 253-273.
Dyer, W. G. &; Whetten, D. A. 2006. Family firms and social responsibility: Preliminary evidence from the S&;P 500. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 30(6): 785-802.
Eisenhardt, K. M. &; Martin, J. A. 2000. Dynamic capabilities: What are they? Strategic Management Journal, 21(10-11): 1105-1121.
Faccio, M., Lang, L. H. P., &; Young, L. 2001. Dividends and expropriation. American Economic Review, 91(1): 54-78.new window
Faccio, M. &; Lang, L. H. P. 2002. The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations. Journal of Financial Economics, 65(3): 365-395.
Faleye, O. 2007. Classified boards, firm value, and managerial entrenchment. Journal of Financial Economics, 83(2): 501-529.
Fama, E. F. &; Jensen, M. C. 1983. Separation of Ownership and Control. Journal of Law &; Economics, 26(2): 301-325.
Finkelstein, S. &; Hambrick, D. C. 1990. Top-Management-Team Tenure and Organizational Outcomes - the Moderating Role of Managerial Discretion. Administrative Science Quarterly, 35(3): 484-503.
Francis, J. &; Smith, A. 1995. Agency Costs and Innovation Some Empirical-Evidence. Journal of Accounting &; Economics, 19(2-3): 383-409.
Gallo, G. A., Tapies, J., &; Cappuyns, K. 2000. Comparison of family and non-family business: Financial logic and personal preferences. Universtiy of Navarra.
Gomez-Mejia, L. R., Nunez-Nickel, M., &; Gutierrez, I. 2001. The role of family ties in agency contracts. Academy of Management Journal, 44(1): 81-95.new window
Gomez-Mejia, L. R., Haynes, K. T., Nunez-Nickel, M., Jacobson, K. J. L., &; Moyano-Fuentes, J. 2007. Socioemotional wealth and business risks in family-controlled firms: Evidence from Spanish olive oil mills. Administrative Science Quarterly, 52(1): 106-137.new window
Gomez-Mejia, L. R., Makri, M., &; Kintana, M. L. 2010. Diversification Decisions in Family-Controlled Firms. Journal of Management Studies, 47(2): 223-252.
Gomez-Mejia, L. R., Cruz, C., Berrone, P., &; De Castro, J. 2011. The Bind that Ties: Socioemotional Wealth Preservation in Family Firms. Academy of Management Annals, 5: 653-707.
Graves, S. B. 1988. Institutional Ownership and Corporate R-and-D in the Computer Industry. Academy of Management Journal, 31(2): 417-428.
Grossman, S. J. &; Hart, O. D. 1983. An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem. Econometrica, 51(1): 7-45.new window
Hall, B. H. &; Ziedonis, R. H. 2001. The patent paradox revisited: an empirical study of patenting in the US semiconductor industry, 1979-1995. Rand Journal of Economics, 32(1): 101-128.new window
Hambrick, D. C. &; Finkelstein, S. 1987. Managerial Discretion - a Bridge between Polar Views of Organizational Outcomes. Research in Organizational Behavior, 9: 369-406.
Hansen, G. S. &; Hill, C. W. L. 1991. Are Institutional Investors Myopic - a Time-Series Study of 4 Technology-Driven Industries. Strategic Management Journal, 12(1): 1-16.new window
Hill, C. W. L. &; Snell, S. A. 1988. External Control, Corporate-Strategy, and Firm Performance in Research-Intensive Industries. Strategic Management Journal, 9(6): 577-590.
 
 
 
 
第一頁 上一頁 下一頁 最後一頁 top
:::
無相關著作
 
無相關點閱
 
QR Code
QRCODE

臺灣人文及社會科學引文索引資料庫

目前上線人數：959（臺灣：956，外國：3） ／ 本年度總使用人次：1908780 ／ 訪客人次（自102年09月）：67703539
國家圖書館著作權聲明 Copyright © 2013 All rights reserved.
本館地址: 100201臺北市中山南路20號． 本館地圖及交通資訊．
總機：(02)23619132．最佳瀏覽解析度為1024x768以上