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題名：政府股權對公司治理與企業績效之影響
作者：黃玟心 引用關係
作者(外文)：Wen-Hsin Huang
校院名稱：國立臺灣大學
系所名稱：會計學研究所
指導教授：林世銘
學位類別：博士
出版日期：2014
主題關鍵詞：政府股權；政府持股比例；公股董監事；公股主要股東；公司治理；企業績效；Government shareholding；government ownership；government-controlled seats in board of directors；government as the major shareholder；corporate governance；firm performance
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近幾年來政府持續推行公司治理之改革工作，透過各種法規及政策層面之實施，以期提升企業之公司治理水準，這是政府身為建構及維持公平競爭的經濟環境的公權力角色；另一方面，政府對於股權投資之企業，又兼具有股東身分。由於政府所能運用之資源較一般投資人多，理論上政府持有股權之公司應該有較高的公司治理水準以及較佳的企業績效。本研究主要目的係探討 (1)政府對上市公司之股權投資，與企業之公司治理與企業績效之相關性，以及(2)政府是否能藉由股權投資，提升被投資企業之公司治理情形，進一步對企業績效產生正面影響等兩個議題加以探討。
本研究利用政府持股比例、公股董監事席次以及公股主要股東身分，做為政府股權投資的衡量變數。實證結果顯示政府透過股權投資取得被投資企業之董監事席次時，有助於建構良好的公司治理機制。政府身為主要股東角色時，對被投資企業公司治理會產生正面影響。研究結果亦證實公司治理水準確實有助於企業經營，市場投資人對公司治理良好的企業產生正面評價。在企業績效方面，實證結果指出政府持股比例與績效呈現倒U型之非線性關係，代表政府在持股轉折點前的適度股權投資，對企業績效會有正面的助益，然而持股比例過多時卻可能存在過多的政府的干涉，對企業績效產生不利的影響。當被投資企業公司治理機制相對較弱時，政府股權及公司治理水準對被投資公司的企業績效的影響力較大。在進行結構方程模式的實證分析後，除了能驗證政府藉由股權投資，對企業公司治理與績效有直接正向影響，還能觀察到政府股權透過提升被投資企業之公司治理水準，進一步對公司績效產生正面影響之間接效果。
In recent years, the government has continued to promote the reform of corporate governance through the implementation of various regulations and policies that enhance corporate governance standards. This is the public authority role for government to build and maintain a fair and competitive economic environment and allow market mechanisms to function soundly. On the other hand, the government is also a shareholder in investee enterprises. As a result of this dual role, the government can exercise more policy tools and resources than other investors. Therefore, the government should bear more responsibility in improving the corporate governance of investee enterprises. This study aims to examine (1) the relationship among government shareholdings, corporate governance, and firm performance, and (2) whether corporate governance could be an intermediary role in the relationship between government shareholdings and firm performance. That is, government could improve firm performance through the channel that the positive impact of government shareholdings on corporate governance, and further influence firm performance. We use government ownership, government-controlled seats in board of directors, and government as a major shareholder to proxy government shareholdings level in investee firms.
The empirical results show that the existence or the proportion of government-controlled seats in board of directors is positively related to corporate governance. The existence of government as a major shareholder in investee firm is positively related to corporate governance. And better-governed firms have higher operating performance and higher valuation in stock markets. Our results show that government ownership significantly impacts firm performance. The degree of impact on firm performance follows an inverted U-shape pattern, with performance increasing with the government ownership, up to an optimal level in turnover. Beyond that level, firm performance declined with increasing ownership. This result suggests that too much government ownership may lead to improperly control and interference in the operations of investee firms. Furthermore, we find that for firms under weaker governance, government shareholdings and corporate governance could play more powerful roles in elevating firm performance. Using Structural Equation Model (SEM), we verify the direct effect of government shareholdings on corporate governance and firm performance. We also observe the indirect effect of government shareholdings on firm performance through the channel that government shareholdings exercise influence on a firm’s corporate governance.
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