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題名：家族企業特質與盈餘資訊品質之關聯性－從盈餘管理與盈餘反應係數角度探討
作者：湯麗芬 引用關係
作者(外文)：TANG, LI-FEN
校院名稱：國立臺北大學
系所名稱：會計學系
指導教授：李建然
學位類別：博士
出版日期：2008
主題關鍵詞：家族企業；集團企業；公司治理；盈餘品質；Family-controlled firms；Business groups；Corporate Governance；earnings quality.
原始連結：連回原系統網址new window
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台灣許多企業為家族企業，而家族企業獨特的特質可能使其公司治理環境與非家族企業有所不同。然而，囿於家族特質相關資料蒐集不易，造成目前鮮有相關實證文獻，深入探討家族企業特質對盈餘品質的影響。因此本文將以家族企業為對象，藉由延伸代理理論，針對控制家族持有之股權、控制權與現金流量權偏離程度、家族企業集團化的情況、家族成員涉入董事會程度以及創設者涉入經營程度，深入探討家族企業特質的各個構面對盈餘品質之影響。
本文將分別以異常應計數及盈餘反應係數為家族企業盈餘資訊品質之衡量指標。實證結果發現，以異常應計數代理盈餘品質時，家族持股比率愈高、控制權與現金流量權偏離程度愈大、家族企業所屬集團機構中海外成員個數愈多，且創設者擔任總經理或董事長時，則其盈餘品質將較差。然而，以盈餘反應係數衡量盈餘品質時，實證結果卻發現，家族持股比率愈高、家族企業所屬集團機構中非上市(櫃)成員個數愈多，且創設者擔任總經理或董事長時，投資者認為其盈餘品質將較佳。相反的，當家族企業隸屬於集團機構時，則投資者認為其盈餘品質將較差。
此外，本文更進一步檢測家族持股比率與盈餘品質是否具有非線性關係。然而，不論以異常應計數或盈餘反應係數衡量盈餘品質，實證結果皆未發現家族股權與盈餘品質呈非線性關係。
本文以較精確且深入之家族特質資料，並從異常應計數與盈餘反應係數兩個角度，檢視家族企業特質對盈餘品質之影響。因此針對家族企業盈餘品質之研究，本文將提供比現存文獻更深入且完整的探討，補足現存文獻之不足。此外，本文的實證結果亦能提醒主管機關及投資大眾對家族企業盈餘品質之重視，並提供擬定相關政策之參考，進而提昇公司治理之效能。
In Taiwan, most firms are family-controlled business. And the characteristics of family-controlled firms may lead the corporate governance is unique. However, due to limited data available, there are few study investigate the relation between the family-controlled firms and the earnings quality. For this reason, this study will investigate how the characteristics of family-controlled firms affect the earnings quality.
The earnings quality is measured by discretionary accruals and earnings response coefficients. By using the discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings quality, we find that the most characteristics (such as family ownership, degree of divergence between the ultimate owner’s control and the equity ownership level, the number of oversea subsidiaries in the group, and the founder occupied CEO or chairman) will lower earnings quality. However, when the earnings quality is measured by earnings response coefficients, the most characteristics (such as family ownership, the number of non-listed subsidiaries in the group, and the founder occupied CEO or chairman) are associated with greater earnings informativeness.
Furthermore, the study examine whether the relation between family ownership and earnings quality is nonlinear. However, we did not find evidence that the relation between family ownership and earnings quality is nonlinear.
The study probes the relation between family-controlled firms and earnings quality, which is not fully investigated in prior literature and the results provide regulators with a guidelines to improve the earnings quality and corporate governance of family-controlled firms.
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