本論文從兩岸關係的結構出發，探討兩岸政治談判的立場與經濟策略運用，並分析未來兩岸政治談判的可能性。筆者首先敘述五二○後兩岸隔海政治對話的情形，分析兩岸談判立場的變動情形，以便尋求雙方政治談判的可能底線；同時以「三通」做為兩岸政治談判的主要經濟策略，說明兩岸雙方如何藉由「三通」議題營造有利的政治談判環境。其次筆者分析五二○後兩岸關係的內外結構因素如何影響兩岸關係的發展，並限制兩岸政治談判的立場與策略。接著根據兩岸關係的結構限制與發展趨勢，參考西方談判理論有關「安全點」的概念，分析未來兩岸政治談判的基礎與前景。最後，綜合先前的論述做出結論，並提出建言，以結束本文的討論。

　　　　　From the structural perspective of Cross-Strait Relations, this article discusses the political positions and economic strategies in cross-Strait negotiations, and analyzes the possibility that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait will begin negotiations. First, this author reviews the political dialogue across the Strait after May 20, and analyzes how the two parties' negotiation positions evolved using the "three links" as the main economic strategy in cross-strait negotiations, this author explains how the two parties have built a favorable political negotiation environment via the issue of "three links." Next, this author analyzes how the inner and outer structure of cross-strait relations influences the development of cross-strait relations and restricts the negotiation positions and strategies within. Then, based on the structural limitation and developmental trends, and referring to the concept of "security point" in western negotiation theory, this author analyzes the foundation of, and prospects, for future cross-strait political negotiation. Finally, the article ends by drawing conclusions and making suggestions.