Being conditioned by the international environment, political settlement would be the practical approach to escape from Cross-Strait security dilemma. Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) is one of the perceived political settlements as engaging antagonistic countries. CBMs aim to mitigate possibility of conflict between countries which escalate resulted from misunderstanding and misestimating, so as to build confident basis necessary for security cooperation, including declaration, communication, transpiration, constraint, and verification measures. Reviewing European experience of CBMs, big powers’ position is the key point decided whether adversaries can set CBMs or not. Based on this viewpoint, U.S. would play a decisive role in the progress of the Cross-Strait CBMs. This article aims to explore the effects and implications of constructing Cross-Strait CBMs as strategic triangle relations changing among U.S., Taiwan, and China by Lowell Dittmer’s theory. First, it reviews research documents about CBMs and collect usable arguments. Second, to provide development and achievements of Cross-Strait CBMs. Finally, to explain what the predicament and prosperity could be as using the Lowell Dittmer’s theory to analyze recent U.S.-Taiwan-China strategic triangle relations. The result shows that, strategic triangle analysis can help the Cross-Strait studies getting closer to international reality, and rethink the strategic direction of national security planning which suggests materials in foreign policy decision-making process.