一九九零年代臺灣的民主化，是在既有的〈中華民國憲法〉框架基礎上，通過憲政改革，重新建構國家機器對臺灣民族國家的過程，對於新憲法制度原理的認識，自然脫離不了五權憲法的制度歷史遺緒，但也不能無視於推動憲政改革的政治邏輯。 再者，二零零零年總統大選後的政黨輪替，中國國民黨喪失了政治主導權，使憲政制度本身首度可以有機會擺脫國民黨的黨政運作與控制，但陳水扁新府運轉的經驗，卻令人感到失望，許多人認為政黨輪替後臺灣之所以出現各種政治運作上的亂象問題，和憲政體級的密切相關。實情究竟如何？臺灣的治理危機，有多大程度和半總統制有關？還是出自更深層的憲政文化的問題？對於制度的正確認識，是否可以解決這一憲法上的知識所帶來的政治亂象？憲政制度與民主治理的關係，究竟如何？ 本文即嘗試就憲政改革後新制度的運作原理，給予理論上的釐清，並對於憲政改革的方向，提供建議。

　　　　　Taiwan's democratization in the 1990s was the process of reconstructing state apparatuses and the Taiwanese nation-state through constitutional reform based on the given framework of the constitution of the Republic of China. Certainly, knowing the theorem of the new constitutional institution, one cannot ignore the historical legacy of the five powers constitutional institution nor the political logic pushing constitutional reform. Moreover, the Kuomingtang's loss of political control after the political party alternation in the 2000 popular election gave the constitutional institution the opportunity to be free from the Kuomingtang's exercise and control. But the experience of the constitutional institutional operation by the Chen Shui-bian administration has left people disappointed. In the opinion of many, the political chaos after the political party alternation in 2000 is connected to the design of the constitutional institution. What are whys and wherefores? How has the semi-presidentialism affected the governing crisis? Or is the problem rooted in the constitutional culture? Is it helpful for setting the political chaos resulting from conflicting diverse views of the Constitution by understanding the institution in a correct way? What is the relationship between the constitutional institution and democratic governances? This article tries to clarify the theorem of the new constitutional institution and also givers suggestions for the next-step of constitutional reform.