胡塞爾在《觀念一》一書中，試圖比較笛卡兒普遍懷疑嘗試的方法，以導出現象學懸置或是還原的方法。本文將先評論一般對胡塞爾現象學懸置與還原法理解的缺失，詳細分析《觀念一》第三十一節的文本，並試圖釐清這兩種方法的差異，以期伐出胡塞爾懸置法的真正方法意涵。在本分析中，我們看見懸置法真正的方法在於它的「不參與」特性與其徹底化的可能上，而它應用的對象則為存信念中，信念確定性的執態與阻礙的雙重結構。經由此雙重有效性結構的懸置，我們將達到新的現象學態度。

In order to explain the true meaning of the peoché, Husserl tries in Ideas I campring his own phenomenological method i.e. peoché with the “attempt to doubt universally” of Descrates. In current work, there are some common misunderstandings in discussion of the epoché that the author is to analyze the text in paragraph 31 of Ideas I and provide the correct and true meanings of the epoché. The methodology of the epoché is consistent in its non-making character, and the genuine objects within the epoché are the validity of being-belief in structure of the cognitive position-takings and hindrance. By eliminating of such validity structure, the new phenomenological attitude can then be achieved.