本文的目標有二：首先是釐清胡塞爾與海德格對「超越」的理解並鋪陳兩者連續性，其次則是指出西田幾多郎對現象學的貢獻。在行文上區分為四個節次，首先（一）筆者沿著兩重世界的區分來鋪陳超越問題，顯示現象學對「超越問題」的解決線索在「意向性」。隨之（二）我們透過胡塞爾1907年的《現象學觀念》來討論現象學對「內在」與「超越」的重新理解，並透過胡塞爾的「內在視域」與「外在視域」來闡釋包含在我們的體驗中的超越經驗。接著（三）我們討論海德格對胡塞爾的意向性的改造，如所周知，海德格將超越問題的討論引向此在的「世界體驗」，意向性在這裡成為「此在的存在」問題。筆者在這裡進一步闡釋世界的超越的意義，並且主張作為超越之最終指向的世界是「本真的世界」。最後（四）我們從西田的立場來反省胡塞爾與海德格的現象學，筆者將批判的重點置西田的「否定的自覺」與現象學的「唯我論」問題。

My intention in this article is twofold. Firstly, it aims to clarify the meanings of the ＂transcendence＂ in Husserl’s and Heidegger’s phenomenology and, secondly, to indicate the significance of Nishida’s contributions to phenomenology. This article is divided into four sections. Section one is a brief introduction to the basic problems of understanding transcendence in philosophy. In section two, I explicate Husserl’s redefinition of transcendence. Husserl elucidates intentionality in terms of transcendence. His basic understanding of immanence and transcendence is discussed in The Idea of Phenomenology (1907). I expound and expand the meanings of transcendence through Husserl’s ＂inner horizon＂ and ＂outer horizon.＂ In section three, I discuss Heidegger’s rethinking and transformation of Husserl’s intentionality in terms of the ＂transcendence of Dasein (existence).＂ I argue that Heidegger’s approach to intentionality implies the transcendence toward an authentic Dasein. Transcendence is ultimately the transcendence to authentic self. In the last section, I discuss Nishida’s insights into the nature of true self. Nishida begins his philosophy together with Husserl and Heidegger from a Cartesian point of view, but his notion of self-awareness is basically religion-oriented. He regards it as ＂negating self-awareness.＂ The self-negating is absolute and excludes any possible sense from Solipsism. Some of Nishida’s possible contributions and new perspectives that Nishida provided to phenomenology will be expounded.