任何一個成熟的司法制度都必須能回答人民一個基本的問題：「我可以在這裡訴訟嗎？」訴訟法之目的在提供當事人於其權利救濟程序中得到「公平、迅速、低廉的判決」，基此，每一個人都期待現行法律可以對於這問題給予一個簡潔、直接了當的回答。特別是具有涉外因素的跨國訴訟，國際裁判管轄權更是影響當事人權利甚鉅。美國管轄權基礎理論已發展一百多年，具有相當豐富的實務與學術論述。其中以短暫過境管轄權最引起事論，此種管轄權源自於英國普通法，美國聯邦最高法院最早在Pennoyer中奠立基礎，歷經將近百年之發展，原本多數學者都認為，在管轄權作為人權之潮流下，基於所在權力理論而發展的短暫過境管轄權可能逐漸被揚棄。可惜的是，1990年聯邦最高法院的Burnham判決卻堅持繼續採用這種公平性普遭質疑的管轄權，下級法院似乎也多數探取相同立場。形成美國學界及實務界對於短暫過境管轄權不同之見解。我國並無國際裁判管轄權之實定法，但民事訴訟法第四百零二條第二款但書卻承認在外國受送達之判決效力，等同間接承認短暫過境管轄權之合法性。本文經由探討比較美國實務界及學界之見解，認為短暫過境管轄權在公平性、保障人權及國際趨勢這三方面，存在相當程度之缺陷。我國日後發展國際裁判管轄權時，應引以為鑑，避免引進這種管轄權基礎。

Every developed legal system must provide an answer to the simple, but important, question: "Can I sue here?" Civil Procedure, is designed to achieve the "just, speedy, and inexpensive determination" of litigation, litigant should expect modem law to furnish a simple, straightforward answer to this question. But, transient jurisdiction has consistently disappointed this expectation. Litigating for many years only to hear in the end that one was in the wrong court is an enormous waste of time, effort, and money for everybody -- the courts, plaintiffs, defendants -- except for the attorneys. Indeed, many scholars agree that transient jurisdiction is generally an unfair doctrine, given its potential for fortuitous and burdensome consequences upon defendants, and therefore should not persist. Unfortunately, The United State Supreme Court upheld the transient jurisdiction in the post-Shaffer era in Burnham v. Superior Court of California In contrast, this article argues that due process clause guarantee that individuals--regardless of whether they had notice of an action--will not be compelled to appear in a court with which they have no connection. Whether jurisdiction in the sense of due process exists depends upon concepts of "fairness" and "convenience" and not upon mere compliance with procedural requirements of notice, nor even "presence" within the state. A court will be unable to exercise jurisdiction over a party only if actual costs of appearance clearly and substantially outweigh the national interest in permitting litigation in that tribunal. Thus, this article conclude that transient jurisdiction, appears inconsistent with the characterization of personal jurisdiction as an individual right (not an inherent limitation on judicial power), and should be reexamined, at least in the limited factual context of casually present international defendants with no or unrelated forum contacts.