有限責任是現代公司發展之利基。在公司組織發展的數百年間，三大特色形塑其與傳統合夥、獨資之不同；包括公司具有獨立於其成員之法人格、將出資分成股份（或持分）並成為交易客體及有限責任。 如何在固守有限責任下強化對債權人保護之機制一直是公司法的重要課題。其所涉之範圍十分廣泛，本文僅就董事失格制度與資本三原則二者，論述有限責任下，保障債權人的二種重要機制。前者係從公司之經營管理者著手，後者則戮力於公司資本及財產之規範，各有其意。 我國公司法及其他相關立法雖普遍存有公司董事、監察人、經理人，甚至發起人消極資格之規定，然該規定之目的似乎不甚明確。亦即，禁止目的究竟在於保護公共利益抑或在於懲罰行為人，此應予以釐清。 有關經營者消極資格之規定在範圍上應參考外國立法例及我國特殊情形重做設計。此外，可以考慮讓法院在失格制度上扮演一定之角色，使失格制度之運用更貼近現實需求。 另一方面，資本三原則雖然有一定之效用，然此僅為一種公司管理哲學的選項；我們仍應正視其效果有限之事實並為適當之修正。長久以來，最低資本額之規定最為小型企業垢病，卻未受到重視。頻繁的法律修正並未碰觸最深層之公司管理哲學的辯論；當公司治理喊的震天價響時，卻未看見資本原則之檢討，僅僅做了授權資本制之改變。對於規模不同的公司，資本三原則沒有加以區別。 英國雖受制於第二號公司法指令而必須就公眾公司加以管制，但其二○○五年之公司法改革白皮書認真思考私人公司之出路及未來，對於我國公司法之發展，深具啟發。

Over the last three hundred years, Company law has developed three pillars that have harnessed its strength and guided its economic development. These three pillars are the separate personality from corporate members, the limited liability of corporate members, and the division of capital into stocks or shares that are transferable. These characteristics make companies different from the traditional single traders or partnerships. Among these developments, the concept of limited liability has been a cause for much concern, especially among corporate creditors. As a result, corporate legislation has always struggled to maintain the principle of limited liability while at the same time establishing a legal framework to protect creditors. There are several mechanisms that have been adopted to achieve this goal. This paper focuses on two commonly used theories, namely, the three principles of capital and directors' disqualification. Based on the company Law in Taiwan and other financial legislation, the “passive qualification” requirements are not uncommon. However, looking at the legislative purpose behind these requirements does not say much about their roots. Consequently, the following issue is raised: Why do we prohibit certain people from holding the position of a director, supervisor, manager or promoter? Is it really in the public interest or is it to punish these undesirable persons? On the contrary, a system referred to as “directors' disqualification” has been recognized in the United Kingdom. Its purposes and ambit have been clarified to a certain extent, and may serve as very good reference for Taiwan's future development in this field. On the other hand, Taiwan's Company Law has long adopted the three principles of capital that have been transplanted from German law. In spite of all the criticism that has been heaped on the principles, these principles continue to survive. There is a pressing need to reconsider the core values of the capital principle and re-build the framework to help creditors with regard to its substance. The U.K. has embarked on the reform of her corporate legislation over the last couple of years. Based on that, some suggestions are particularly noteworthy and deserve our careful attention.