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題名：Corporate Governance: Directors' Liability and Board Structure
書刊名：管理評論
作者：陳彩稚 引用關係／張瑞益 引用關係
作者(外文)：Chen, Tsai-jyh／Chang, Jui-i
出版日期：2011
卷期：30:3
頁次：頁1-23
主題關鍵詞：公司治理；董事會結構；董監事責任；董監事暨重要職員責任保險；Corporate governance；Board structure；Directors' liability；Directors' and officers' insurance
原始連結：連回原系統網址new window
相關次數：
  • 被引用次數被引用次數:期刊(16) 博士論文(0) 專書(0) 專書論文(0)
  • 排除自我引用排除自我引用:16
  • 共同引用共同引用:0
  • 點閱點閱:82
本文目的在於探討沙賓法案Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX)之後，董監事法律責任對公司治理之影響，以及分析董事會組成之決定因素。本研究以台灣上市公司2003-2007 年之資料進行實證分析，研究結果顯示董事會之獨立性與董監事暨重要職員責任保險、負債比率、執行長之主導權以及高科技產業有顯著正向關係。董事長兼執行長之雙重領導現象(leadership duality)則與公司規模成反向關係，但與高科技產業成正向關係。此外，小型公司之董事會人數可能因有董監事責任保險保障而增加，但是在大型公司中則無此現象。整體而言，本研究結果顯示董監事之法律責任對於董事會的結構具有重要影響力，而其責任保險保障在公司治理上則可提供監督之功能。
This paper attempts to investigate the effect of directors’ liability on corporate governance and the determinants of the board after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). Based on the data of public firms in Taiwan during 2003-2007, the empirical findings suggest that board independence is positively related to Directors’ & Officers’ (D&O) insurance, debt ratio, bargaining power of CEO and high technology industry. Board leadership duality is negatively related to firm size and positively related to high technology industry. The findings also show that board size is positively related to D&O insurance in small firms but unrelated in large firms.The results in general suggest that directors’ liability is an important determinant of board structure and D&O insurance provides monitoring incentive for corporate governance.
期刊論文
1.Gompers, P. A.、Ishii, J. L.、Metrick, A.(2003)。Corporate Governance and Equity Price。Quarterly Journal of Economics，118，107-155。  new window
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3.Linck, James S.、Netter, Jeffry M.、Yang, Tina(2008)。The Determinants of Board Structure。Journal of Financial Economics，87(2)，308-328。  new window
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5.Maug, E.(1997)。Boards of directors and capital structure: alternative forms of corporate restructuring。Journal of Corporate Finance，3(2)，113-139。  new window
6.Wright, P.、Kroll, M.、Krug, J. A.、Pettus, M.(2007)。Influences of top management team incentives on firm risk taking。Strategic Management Journal，28，81-89。  new window
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8.Hermalin, Benjamin E.、Weisbach, Michael S.(1998)。Endogenously Chosen Boards of Directors and Their Monitoring of the CEO。The American Economic Review，88(1)，96-118。  new window
9.Himmelberg, C. P.、Hubbard, R. G.、Palia, D.(1999)。Understanding the Determinants of Managerial Ownership and the Link between Ownership and Performance。Journal of Financial Economics，53，353-384。  new window
10.O'Sullivan, Noel(2002)。The Demand for Directors' and Officers' Insurance by Large UK Companies。European Management Journal，20(5)，574-583。  new window
11.Daniels, Ronald J.、Hutton, Susan(1993)。The capricious cushion: The implications of the directors and insurance liability crisis on Canadian corporate governance。Canadian Business Law Journal，22(2)，182-230。  new window
12.Gutiérrez, María(2003)。An Economic Analysis of Corporate Directors' Fiduciary Duties。The RAND Journal of Economics，34(3)，516-535。  new window
13.Coles, Jeffery L.、Daniel, Naveen D.、Naveen, Lalitha(2008)。Boards: Does one size fit all?。Journal of Financial Economics，87(2)，329-356。  new window
14.Shu, S. Z.(2000)。Auditor resignations: Clientele effects and legal liability。Journal of Accounting and Economics，29(2)，173-205。  new window
15.Brickley, James A.、Coles, Jeffrey L.、Jarrell, Gregg(1997)。Leadership structure: Separating the CEO and Chairman of the Board。Journal of Corporate Finance，3(3)，189-220。  new window
16.Fama, Eugene F.、Jensen, Michael C.(1983)。Separation of ownership and control。The Journal of Law & Economics，26(2)，301-325。  new window
17.Gaver, Jennifer J.、Gaver, Kenneth M.(1993)。Additional evidence on the association between the investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies。Journal of Accounting and Economics，16(1-3)，125-160。  new window
18.Chalmers, John M. R.、Dann, Larry Y.、Harford, Jarrad(2002)。Managerial Opportunism? Evidence from Directors' and Officers' Insurance Purchases。The Journal of Finance，57(2)，609-636。  new window
19.Core, John E.(1997)。On the corporate demand for directors' and officers' insurance。Journal of Risk and Insurance，64(1)，63-87。  new window
20.Holderness, Clifford G.(1990)。Liability insurers as corporate monitors。International Review of Law and Economics，10(2)，115-129。  new window
21.Chhaochharia, Vidhi、Grinstein, Yaniv(2007)。Corporate Governance and Firm Value: The Impact of the 2002 Governance Rules。Journal of Finance，62(4)，1789-1825。  new window
22.Eisenberg, Theodore、Sundgren, Stefan、Wells, Martin T.(1998)。Larger board size and decreasing firm value in small firms。Journal of Financial Economics，48(1)，35-54。  new window
23.Klein, April(1998)。Firm Performance and Board Committee Structure。The Journal of Law and Economics，41(1)，275-304。  new window
24.Bhagat, Sanjai、Black, Bernard S.(2002)。The Non-Correlation Between Board Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance。Journal of Corporation Law，27(2)，231-273。  new window
25.Hermalin, B. E.、Weisbach, M. S.(2003)。Boards of Directors as an Endogenously Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature。Economic Policy Review，9(1)，7-26。  new window
26.Stulz, René M.(1988)。Managerial control of voting rights: Financing policies and the market for corporate control。Journal of Financial Economics，20(1/2)，25-54。  new window
27.Jensen, Michael C.(1993)。The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems。The Journal of Finance，48(3)，831-880。  new window
28.Raheja, Charu G.(2005)。Determinants of Board Size and Composition: A Theory of Corporate Boards。Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis，40(2)，283-306。  new window
29.Black, Bernard S.、Jang, Hasung、Kim, Woochan(2006)。Does Corporate Governance Predict Firms' Market Values? Evidence from Korea。Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization，22(2)，366-413。  new window
30.Cremers, M.、Nair, V.(2005)。Governance mechanisms and equity prices。The Journal of Finance，60(6)，2859-2894。  new window
31.Jensen, Michael C.、Meckling, William H.(1976)。Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure。Journal of Financial Economics，3(4)，305-360。  new window
32.Boone, Audra、Field, Laura C.、Karpoff, Jonathan M.、Raheij, Charu G.(2007)。The Determinant of Corporate Board Size and Composition: An Empirical Analysis。Journal of Financial Economics，85，66-101。  new window
33.Yermack, David(1996)。Higher Valuation of Companies with a Small Board of Directors。Journal of Financial Economics，40，185-212。  new window
34.Eckbo, B. Epsen、Savita Verma(1994)。Managerial Ownership, Voting Power and Cash Dividend Policy。Journal of Corporate Finance，1，33-62。  new window
35.Redington, William C.(2005)。D&O Underwriting Implications of Sarbanes-Oxley。International Journal of Disclosure and Governance，2，151-158。  new window
圖書
1.Hampel, Ronald(1998)。Committee on Corporate Governance。London：Gee and Co. Ltd.。  new window
2.Cadbury, Adrian(1992)。Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance。London：Gee & Company。  new window
3.Winter, Ralph A.(2000)。Optimal Insurance under Moral Hazard。Handbook of Insurance。Boston。  new window
 
 
 
 
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