孟子、苟子開於人性之“由仁義行”與 “好利順是”之善惡根據的捨斷，作為天命流行其道以生生大化的二個意向性規定，並不是單個體所固有的抽象物。就其本質而言，必然伴隨著〈中庸〉“與天地參，成已成物”之“與……參成”的關聯性而呈現。但就在關聯性之“與……參成”的行生活動中，人性之二個意向性規定具有統一與分裂的可能性。正是基於此可能性基礎，才有心性之善惡的現實性綻出。關於這個基礎的統一性及其分裂為善惡的判斷何以可能，本文將圍繞孟苟“由仁義行”和“好利順是”在“與……參成”的日用展開中，從無滯流行與妄執當前的時間性視域來加以闡釋。

As two intentional determinations of the workings of the fate of heaven, Mencius' ''you ren yi xing＂ and Xunzi's ''bao li shun shi＂ are not abstractions belonging to the individual. They connect essentially with ''yu...can cheng＂ of ''yu tian di can, cheng ji cheng wu＂ in the ＂Doctrine of the Mean＂. But there is the possibility ofboth unity and split in ''yu...can cheng＂, a possibility upon which the difference of good and evil in human nature is based. Focusing on ''you ren yi xing＂ and ＂hao li shun shi＂, which disclose themselves in daily life, this essay interprets the possibility of the unity and split of good and evil human nature in the horizon ofthe timeliness of＂wu zhi liu xing＂ and ＂huang zhi dang qian＂.