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題名:Stock Market Reaction to the Resignation of Compensation Committee Members: Evidence from Taiwan
書刊名:財務金融學刊
作者:潘虹華 引用關係廖懿屏 引用關係
作者(外文):Pan, HunghuaLiao, Yi-ping
出版日期:2018
卷期:26:1
頁次:頁97-118
主題關鍵詞:公司治理薪酬委員會辭職Corporate governanceCompensation committeeResignation
原始連結:連回原系統網址new window
相關次數:
  • 被引用次數被引用次數:期刊(1) 博士論文(0) 專書(0) 專書論文(0)
  • 排除自我引用排除自我引用:1
  • 共同引用共同引用:13
  • 點閱點閱:12
期刊論文
1.Yermack, David(2004)。Remuneration, retention, and reputation incentives for outside directors。The Journal of Finance,59(5),2281-2308。  new window
2.McConnell, John J.、Servaes, Henri(1990)。Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership and Corporate Value。Journal of Financial Economics,27(2),595-612。  new window
3.Fich, Eliezer M.、Shivdasani, Anil(2006)。Are Busy Boards Effective Monitors?。The Journal of Finance,61(2),689-724。  new window
4.Bhagat, Sanjai、Bolton, Brian(2013)。Director ownership, governance, and performance。Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,48(1),105-135。  new window
5.Daily, Catherine M.、Johnson, Jonathan L.、Ellstrand, Alan E.、Dalton, Dan R.(1998)。Compensation committee composition as a determinant of CEO compensation。Academy of Management Journal,41(2),209-220。  new window
6.Denis, David J.、Sarin, Atulya(1999)。Ownership and board structures in publicly traded corporations。Journal of Financial Economics,52,187-223。  new window
7.Dewally, Michaël、Peck, Sarah W.(2010)。Upheaval in the boardroom: Outside director public resignations, motivations, and consequences。Journal of Corporate Finance,16,38-52。  new window
8.Fee, C. Edward、Hadlock, Charles J.(2004)。Management turnover across the corporate hierarchy。Journal of Accounting and Economics,37,3-38。  new window
9.Field, Laura、Lowry, Michelle、Mkrtchyan, Anahit(2013)。Are busy boards detrimental?。Journal of Financial Economics,109(1),63-82。  new window
10.Francis, Bill、Hasan, Iftekhar、Wu, Qiang(2015)。Professors in the boardroom and their impact on corporate governance and firm performance。Financial Management,44(3),547-581。  new window
11.Gupta, Manu、Fields, L. Paige(2009)。Board independence and corporate governance: Evidence from director resignations。Journal of Business Finance and Accounting,36(1/2),161-184。  new window
12.Healy, Paul M.、Palepu, Krishna G.(1990)。Effectiveness of accounting-based dividend covenants。Journal of Accounting and Economics,12,97-124。  new window
13.Helmich, Donald(1974)。Organizational growth and succession patterns。Academy of Management Journal,17,771-775。  new window
14.Helmich, Donald、Brown, Warren(1972)。Successor type and organizational change in the corporate enterprise。Administrative Science Quarterly,17,371-381。  new window
15.Lin, Steve、Pope, Peter F.、Young, Steven(2003)。Stock market reaction to the appointment of outside directors。Journal of Business Finance and Accounting,30(3/4),351-382。  new window
16.Masulis, Ronald W.、Mobbs, Shawn(2014)。Independent director incentives: Where do talented directors spend their time and energy?。Journal of Financial Economics,111,406-429。  new window
17.Sun, Jerry、Cahan, Steven F.、Emanuel, David(2009)。Compensation committee governance quality, chief executive officer stock option grants, and future firm performance。Journal of Banking and Finance,33(8),1507-1519。  new window
18.White, Joshua T.、Woidtke, Tracie、Black, Harold A.、Schweitzer, Robert L.(2014)。Appointments of academic directors。Journal of Corporate Finance,28,135-151。  new window
19.Morck, Randall、Shleifer, Andrei、Vishny, Robert W.(1988)。Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis。Journal of Financial Economics,20(1/2),293-315。  new window
20.DeAngelo, Harry、DeAngelo, Linda、Skinner, Douglas J.(1996)。Reversal of fortune: Dividend signaling and the disappearance of sustained earnings growth。Journal of Financial Economics,40(3),341-371。  new window
21.Core, John E.、Holthausen, Robert W.、Larcker, David F.(1999)。Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance。Journal of Financial Economics,51(3),371-406。  new window
22.Ferris, Stephen P.、Jagannathan, Murali、Pritchard, Adam C.(2003)。Too Busy to Mind the Business? Monitoring by Directors with Multiple Board Appointments。The Journal of Finance,58(3),1087-1111。  new window
23.Shivdasani, Anil、Yermack, David(1999)。CEO involvement in the selection of new board members: An empirical analysis。Journal of Finance,54(5),1829-1853。  new window
24.Anderson, Ronald C.、Bizjak, John M.(2003)。An empirical examination of the role of the CEO and the compensation committee in structuring executive pay。Journal of Banking and Finance,27(7),1323-1348。  new window
25.Sun, Jerry、Cahan, Steven(2009)。The Effect of Compensation Committee Quality on the Association between CEO Cash Compensation and Accounting Performance。Corporate governance: An International Review,17(2),193-207。  new window
26.吳幸蓁、謝佳純、梁書瑋(20141200)。薪酬委員會之設置及其品質對高階經理人薪酬績效敏感性之影響。中華會計學刊,10(2),135-188。new window  延伸查詢new window
27.Brown, Stephen J.、Warner, Jerold B.(1985)。Using Daily Stock Returns: The Case of Event Studies。Journal of Financial Economics,14(1),3-31。  new window
28.Watts, Ross L.、Zimmerman, Jerold L.(1983)。Agency problems, auditing, and the theory of the firm: Some evidence。Journal of Law and Economics,26,613-634。  new window
研究報告
1.Chen, Chia-Wei、Yi, Bingsheng、Lin, Barry J.(2013)。Does adoption of compensation committee benefit shareholders? Evidence from Taiwan。  new window
2.Faleye, Olubunmi、Hoitash, Rani、Hoitash, Udi(2014)。Industry expertise on corporate boards。  new window
3.Fahlenbrach, Rüdiger、Low, Angie、Stulz, René M.(2010)。The dark side of outside directors: Do they quit when they are needed most?。  new window
4.Drobetz, Wolfgang、von Meyerinck, Felix、Oesch, David、Schmid, Markus M.(2015)。Board industry experience, firm value, and investment behavior。  new window
5.Lin, Chan-Jane、Pan, Chao-Jung(2014)。Does the compensation committee mandate enhance the executive compensation practice in Taiwan?。  new window
圖書
1.Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance(1992)。Cadbury Report。London:Gee and Co.。  new window
2.Watts, Ross L.、Zimmerman, Jerold L.(1986)。Positive Accounting Theory。Prentice-Hall, Inc.。  new window
 
 
 
 
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