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題名：薪酬委員會功能之實證研究-家族企業與專業經理人之影響
作者：陳彥綺 引用關係
作者(外文)：CHEN, YEN-CHI
校院名稱：國立臺北大學
系所名稱：會計學系
指導教授：朱炫璉
學位類別：博士
出版日期：2018
主題關鍵詞：薪酬委員會；家族企業；經理人能力；經理人薪酬；專業經理人；compensation committee；family firm；managerial ability；compensation；professional CEO
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本文研究目的是探討薪酬委員會是否能提升經理人能力與薪酬之關聯性。以2011年至2016台灣上市櫃公司為研究樣本(排除金融業)，研究結果顯示若公司重視薪酬委員會，薪酬委員會將會發揮功能並提升經理人能力與薪酬的關聯性。再將研究樣本區分成家族企業與非家族企業，相較於非家族企業，家族企業的公司治理環境較差，若家族企業願意重視薪酬委員會，則薪酬委員會將加強經理人能力與薪酬的關聯性，研究結果顯示薪酬委員會在家族企業中發揮重要功能，協助制訂合理的獎酬機制。將家族企業研究樣本又進一步區分為聘請專業CEO或指派家族成員為CEO，研究結果顯示家族企業聘請專業CEO，表示公司希望透過專業CEO提升公司的經營績效或試圖改革創新，為了能留住好的人才，會更重視薪酬委員會，薪酬委員會將會良好的運作，加強經理人能力與薪酬的關聯性。但是，若家族企業指派家族成員當CEO時，家族CEO會有動機弱化薪酬委員會，薪酬委員會將無法發揮功能。本研究延伸了薪酬委員會有效性之文獻，特別是在家族企業中扮演的重要角色。但是也提醒主管機關或投資者，薪酬委員會並不是萬能的，當家族成員擔任公司管理階層時，刻意弱化薪酬委員會的治理機制，則薪酬委員會將無法發揮功能。
In 2010, the Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) in Taiwan required all listed companies to set up compensation committees before the end of 2011. The purpose of this was to improve compensation practices and to promote transparency and accountability in the process of setting compensation. The objective of this study is to investigate the effect of compensation committee governance quality on top manager compensation and ability. For this study, a sample of listed companies in Taiwan for the fiscal years 2011 to 2016 is used.
The results indicate that compensation committee governance quality strengthens the relationship between top manager compensation and ability. The results also indicate the alignment between compensation for top managers and ability to be more pronounced following improvements in compensation committee governance quality in family firms, but this relationship not existence in nonfamily firms. This implies that compensation committees play a central role in moderating family member power and in making executive compensation fair. Furthermore, the relationship between top managers’ compensation and ability is much stronger in family firms who hire professional CEO, but this relationship not existence in family firms who appoint family member as the firm’s CEO. This result provides insight that may assist regulators and investors with understanding that compensation committees are not panaceas when family member CEO are self-interested who weaken monitoring from compensation committees related to managerial remuneration.
This study’s first contribution is providing evidence that the compensation committees are effective in reasonably compensating managers. Second, family firms pay greater attention to the compensation committee governance quality, which provides substantial benefits to such firms. This reveals the importance of compensation committees in moderating the power of family members especially as it relates to the fairness of executive compensation. Third, the role of the compensation committees in family businesses that hire professional CEO as opposed to family members as CEO is investigated. The results may assist regulators and investors in understanding that compensation committees are not panaceas when family members as CEOs engage in self-interest and weaker monitoring from compensation committees in regard to management remuneration. Regulators may wish to set up a compensation committee evaluation system in the form of information disclosure and a transparent ranking system that handles member information and improves the compensation committee governance quality.
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