由於 「政黨比例代表制」在台灣未來的民意代表選舉中將占有更重要 的地位，故本文的目的乃在於分析該制度下敵對政黨的均衡競選支出狀況。本文 利用一空間選舉模型，假設政黨競爭的目的在於極大化其參選之預期政治利益。 由本文之模型我們可得競選兩黨的支出均衡解，並進而對兩黨之政治立場做比較 靜態分析。最後我們討論若兩黨之一面對經費不足之財務限制的情形，以及提出 政策涵意與建議。

　　　　　As the proportional representation (PR) feature becomes more prominentin the Taiwanese congress electoral system, the purpose of this paper is toanalyze the equilibrium campaign expenditures incurred by competingpolitical parties under this design. In this paper we employ a spatial election model and assume that all participating parties aim at maximizingtheir expected political benefits net of campaign costs. We first solve theunique equilibrium solution of this model, and then carry out comparativestatic analysis. We also study the situations when one of the competingparties faces a binding limited budget to finance its campaign activities.We conclude this paper with policy implications.