臺灣人文及社會科學引文索引資料庫系統

:::

詳目顯示

回上一頁
第 1 筆 / 總合 1 筆   第一頁 上一頁 下一頁 最後一頁
/1頁
題名：效率監督與利益同化對台灣企業的公司價值與管理者薪酬影響–股權結構觀點
作者：楊燿鴻
作者(外文)：Yao-Hung Yang
校院名稱：中原大學
系所名稱：企業管理研究所
指導教授：嚴奇峰
學位類別：博士
出版日期：2013
主題關鍵詞：股權結構觀點；雙元系統；利益同化；公司治理；效率監督；ownership structure perspective；dual system；interest assimilation；Corporate governance；efficiency monitoring
原始連結：連回原系統網址new window
相關次數：
  • 被引用次數被引用次數:期刊(0) 博士論文(0) 專書(0) 專書論文(0)
  • 排除自我引用排除自我引用:0
  • 共同引用共同引用:0
  • 點閱點閱:16
本研究針對台灣電子產業與非電子業中，有關公司治理之效率監督與利益同化進行探討研究。在理論觀點上，有別於代理人理論與管家理論，採用家族企業組織雙元系統觀念切入，從組織成員結構的差序性觀點來發展出股權結構假說，探討股權結構之外圈、內圈、核心圈與家族化控制對公司治理的影響，以補足核心權益代理問題分析上的不足。
本研究以台灣上市櫃公司為主要研究對象，從台灣經濟新報資料庫中整理出2005至20011年的資料，運用STATA軟體進行分析。經過 F test 得知，所有模型都適用於OLS模型。實證結果顯示，外圈之外部法人機構持股增加會促進公司價值，也能提升管理者之薪酬，另一發現，當電子股之核心圈之席次股份偏離倍數增加，可促進公司價值，也能提升管理者薪酬，但非電子類股實證結果並不一致，其核心圈之席次股份偏離倍數增加會降低公司價值，但會提高管理者之薪酬。當核心圈向外合併內圈時即家族化控制時，電子類股顯示，家族控制化程度增加，會降低公司價值，管理者之間會以薪酬相互攏絡，進而圖利自己薪酬。電子類股與非電子類股因股權結構上的差異，對公司價值、董監事與高階經理人薪酬的影響，產生不同的結果。
本文之貢獻在提出股權結構觀點，依照股權結構所處的位置，提出合理的說明，充分反應出台灣社會特殊的股權結構與管理型態，分析企業與其股東之間利益的連結，提供企業更完整的探討，補充過去文獻分析之不足。實務上建議，上市櫃公司可增加其外部法人的持股比率以促進效率監督的力量。電子類股公司控制股東需盡量兼任董監事，方能透過董事會清楚掌握公司方向，使得核心圈的權力結構更緊密進而促進經營效率。相反地，非電子類股公司則因控制股東不比電子類股專業，並不建議由控制股東擔任董監事掌握董事會，本文建議可多讓專業經理人進入董事會，使董事會充份掌握公司營運資訊以促進決策品質。
The reasearch investigated efficiency monitoring and interest assimilation in the corporate governance of the electronics industry and the non-electronics industry in Taiwan. Rather than agency theory and stewardship theory, we employed the concept of the family-enterprise dual system as the breakthrough point and developed the research hypotheses from the different degrees of intimacy of the organization member (shareholder) structure to investigate how the outer circle, the inner circle, the core circle, and a shareholding structure influence corporate governance by familization, compensating for the deficiency in central agency problem analyses.
We selected listed companies in Taiwan as the research objects, sorted the 2005-2011 data from the archives of the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ), and analyzed the data using STATA. The F test result showed that all the models were applicable to the OLS model. The empirical results indicated that the corporate value and compensation of the top management of a company increases when the shareholding of outside institutional shareholders in the outer circle increases. In addition, the corporate value and compensation of the top management of an electronics company increases when the seat-share deviation multiple of the core circle rises. However, the empirical results of non-electronics companies were inconsistent. The corporate value of a non-electronics company decreases, but the compensation of top management increases when the seat-share deviation multiple of the core circle rises. When the core circle of an electronics company merges with the inner circle, a process called familization, the increased familization reduces corporate value, and managers collaborate with each other through compensation and further benefit their own compensation. The differences among ownership structures between electronics and non-electronics companies cause various influences on corporate value and the compensation of directors, supervisors, and high-level managers.
The contributions of this study lie in providing an ownership structure perspective that addresses the position of the ownership structure to explore differences in corporate governance, and reflects on the special ownership structure and management types in Taiwan. The perspective enables analyzing the beneficial connection between a company and shareholders, providing enterprises with a more complete investigation, and supplementing insufficiency in previous literature and analyses. We suggest that the shareholding ratio of the outside institutional shareholders of a listed company should increase to facilitate the power of efficiency monitoring. The controlling shareholders in an electronics company should serve concurrently as directors or supervisors to clearly direct the company through the board of directors, tighten the power structure of the core circle, and facilitate the management efficiency. In contrast, the controlling shareholders of non-electronics companies are less professional than those of electronics companies; thus, the controlling shareholders of a non-electronics company should not serve as directors or supervisors and control the board of directors. Professional high-level managers should serve on the board of directors of a non-electronics company to enable the board of directors to adequately control corporate operation information to increase the quality of decision-making.
1.Agrawal, A. and Mandelker, G. N. (1990). “Large Shareholders and the Monitoring of Managers: The Case of Anti-takeover Charter Amendments,” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 25(2), 143-161.
2.Anderson, R. C. and Reeb, D. M. (2004). “Board Composition: Balancing Family Influence in S&P 500 Firms,” Administrative Science Quarterly, 49(2), 209-237.
3.Andres, C. (2008). “Large Shareholders and Firm Performance- An Empirical Examination of Founding-Family Ownership,” Journal of Corporate Finance, 14(4), 431-445.
4.Bai, C. E., Liu, Q., Lu, J., Song, F. M. and Zhang, J. (2004). “Corporate Governance and Market Valuation in China,” Journal of Comparative Economics, 32(4), 599-616.
5.Baltagi, B. H. (2001), Econometric Analysis of Panel Data, NY: John Wiley.
6.Baltagi, B. H. and Li, Q. (1990). “A Lagrange Multiplier test for the error components model with incomplete panels,” Econometric Reviews, 9(2), 103-107.new window
7.Benston, G. (1985). “The Self-Serving Management Hypothesis: Some Evidence,” Journal of Accounting and Economics, 7(1-3), 67-84.
8.Berle, A. and Means, G. (1932). The Modern Corporation and Private Property, NY: Macmillan.
9.Bhargrava, A., Franzini, L. and Narendranathan, W. (1982). “Serial Correlation and the Fixed Effect Model,” The Review of Economic Studies, 49, 533-549.
10.Black, B. S., Jang, H., Kim, W. and Mark, J. (2006). “Does Corporate Governance Affect Firm Value? Evidence from Korea,” Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 22(2), 366-413.
11.Boyd, B. K. (1994). “Board Control and CEO Compensation,” Strategic Management Journal, 15(5), 335-344.
12.Bozec, R. (2005). “Boards of Directors, Market Discipline and Firm Performance,” Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 32(9-10), 1921-1957.
13.Breusch, T. S. and Pagan, A. R. (1980). “The Lagrange Multiplier Test and Its Applications to Model Specification in Econometrics,” The Review of Economic Studies, 47(1), 239-253.
14.Brickley, J. A., Lease, R. C. and Smith, CW. J. R. (1988). “Ownership Structure and Voting on Anti-Takeover Amendments,” Journal of Financial Economics, 20(1), 267-291.
15.Casson, M. (1999). “The Economics of the Family Firm,” Scandinavian Economic History Review, 47(1), 10-23.
16.Calabro, A., Torchia, M., Pukall, T. and Mussolino, D. (2013). “The Influence of Ownership Structure and Board Strategic Involvement on International Sales: The Moderating Effect of Family Involvement,” International Business Review, 22(3), 509-523.
17.Chaganti, R. and Damanpour, F. (1991). “Institutional Ownership, Capital Structure, and Firm Performance,” Strategic Management Journal, 12, 479-491.
18.Chami, R. (2001). “What is Different about Family Businesses?” IMF Working Paper, 1-38.
19.Cheng, T. (2005). “Executive Compensation Contracts of Family Firms. Working paper, Univesity of Texas.
20.Chung, K. H. and Pruitt, S. W. (1994). “A Simple Approximation of Tobin’s Q,” Financial Management, 23(3), 70-74.
21.Claessens, S. and Fan, J. P. H. (2002). “Corporate Governance in Asia: A Survey,” International Review of Finance, 3(2), 71-103.
22.Claessens, S., Djankov, S., Fan, J. P. H. and Lang, L. H. P. (1999). “Expropriation on Minority Shareholders: Evidence from East Asia,” Police Research Working Paper 2088, The World Bank.
23.Claessens, S., Djanlov, S., Fan, J. P. H. and Lang, L. P. H. (2002). “Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings,” Journal of Finance, 57(6), 2741-2771.
24.Claessens, S., Djankov, S. and Lang, L. H. P. (2000). “The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asia Corporations,” Journal of Financial Economics, 58(1-2), 81-112.
25.Davis, J. H., Schoorman, F. D. and Donaldson, L. (1997). “Toward a Stewardship Theory of Management,” Academy of Management Review, 22(1), 20-47
26.Demsetz, H. and Lehn, K. (1985). “The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences,” Journal of Political Economy, 93(6), 1155-1177.
27.Dittmar, A., Mahrt-Smith, J. and Servaes, H. (2003). “International Corporate Governance and Corporate Cash Holdings,” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 38(1), 111-133.
28.Faccio, M., Lang, L. H. P. and Young, L. (2001). “Dividends and Expropriation,” The American Economic Review, 91(1), 54-78.
29.Fan, J. P. H. and Wong, T. J. (2002). “Corporate Ownership Structure and the Informativeness of Accounting Earnings in East Asia,” Journal of Accounting and Economics, 33(3), 401-425.
30.Filatotchev, I., Lien, Y. C. and Piesse, J. (2005). “Corporate Governance in Publicly Listed, Family-controlled Firms: Evidence from Taiwan,” Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 22(30), 257-283.
31.Flinkelstein, S. and Hambrick, D. C. (1990). “Top Management Team Tenure and Organizational Outcomes: The Moderating Role of Managerial Discretion,” Administrative Science Quarterly, 35(3), 484-503.
32.Gadhoum, Y. (2006). “Power of Ultimate Controlling Owners: A Survey of Canadian Landscape,” Journal of Management and Governance, 10(2), 179-204.
33.Gallo, M. A. and Vilaseca, A. (1996). “Finance in Family Business,” Family Business Review, 9(4), 387-401.
34.Gomes, A. (2000). “Going Public without Governance: Managerial Reputation Effects,” The Journal of Finance, 55(2), 615-646.
35.Grossman, S. J. and Hart, O. D. (1980). “Takeover Bids, the Free-rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation,” Bell Journal of Economics, 11(1), 42-64.
36.Hartzell, J. C. and Starks, L. T. (2003). “Institutional Investors and Executive Compensation,” The Journal of Finance, 58(6), 2351-2374.
37.Hausman, J. A. (1978). “Specification Tests in Econometrics,” Econometrica, 46(6), 1251–1271.
38.Healy, P. M. and Palepu, K. G. (2001). “Information Asymmetry, Corporate Disclosure, and the Capital Market: A Review of the Empirical Disclosure Literature,” Journal of Accounting and Economics, 31(1-3), 405-440.
39.Hermalin, B. E. and Weisbach, M. S. (1991). “The Effects of Board Composition and Direct Incentive on Firm Performance,” Financial Management, 20(4), 101-112.
40.Huang, H. H., Chen, L. C. and Shieh, J. C. P. (2001). “The Impact of Growth Opportunity on Managers' Stock Holding and the Structure of Board of Director,” Sun Yat-Sen Management Review, 9(1), 37-59.
41.Hung, J. H., Cheng, H. J. and Ke, C. Y. (2005). “The Impact of Board Characteristics and Ownership Structure on Debt: An Agency Theory Perspective,” Journal of Management & Systems, 12(4), 33-53.
42.Hung, J. H., Cheng, Y. P. and Hsu, K. T. (2010). “Share Repurchase Activities in Family Firms: An Agency Theory Perspective,” NTU Management Review, 21(1), 171-204.
43.Hwang, K. K. (1987). “Face and Favor: The Chinese Power Game,” The American Journal of Sociology, 92(4), 944-974.
44.Jensen, M. C. and Meckling, W. H. (1976). “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure,” Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305-360.
45.Kalton, G.., Kasprzyk, D. and McMillen, D. (1998). Nonsampling Errors in Panel Surveys. NY: John Wiley.
46.Kao, L. F., Chen, R. C. Y. and Li, S.C. (2006). “Transparency and Deviation between Board Seat Ratio and Cash Flow Rights on Firm Performance: Evidence from Electronic Firms in Taiwan,” Taiwan Academy of Management Journal, 6(2), 81-104.
47.Kao, L. F. and Chiou, J. R. (2002). “The Effect of Collateralized Shares on Informativeness of Accounting Earnings,” NTU Management Review, 13(1), 127-162.
48.Khanna, T. and Palepu, K. (1997). “Why Focused Strategies May be Wrong for Emerging Markets,” Harvard Business Review, 75(4), 41-51.
49.La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A. (1999). “Corporate Ownership around the World,” Journal of Finance, 54(2), 471-517.
50.La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. W. (2002). “Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation,” Journal of Finance, 57(3), 1147-1170.
51.Lee, C. Y. and Su, W. C. (2009). “R&D Commitment and Firm Performance: A study of Taiwanese Family Business,” Organization and management, 2(2), 197-221.
52.Lee, P. M. and O’neill, H. M. (2003). “Ownership Structures and R&D Investments of U.S. and Japanese Firms: Agency and Stewardship Perspectives,” Academy of Managerial Journal, 46(2), 212-225.
53.Lee, Y. C. and Ma, T. (2006). “The Study of the Cost of Debt Financing of Taiwan's Family Firms,” Management Review, 25(3), 69-91.
54.Lemmon, M. L. and Lins, K. V. (2003). “Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance, and Firm Value: Evidence from the East Asian Financial Crisis,” Journal of Finance, 58(4), 1445-1468.
55.Lin, B. R. (2010) “Family Firm and Firm Performance: An Empirical Evidence from Taiwan Stock Exchange,” Soochow Journal of Accounting, 3(1), 53-82.
56.Lin, C. H. and Lu, C. L. (2008). “Corporate Governance, Diversification Strategy in Mergers and Acquisitions and Performances for Taiwanese Family Firms,” Asia-Pacific Economic and Management Review, 11(2), 107-134.
57.Lin, C. J. and Chang, C. C. (2009). “Abnormal Change of Board Members, Family Firms and Fraud, ” International Journal of Accounting Studies, 48(1), 1-33
58.Lin, W. Y. and Hsu, C. Y. (2008). “A Research on Ownership Structure and Corporate Governance Performance Indicators of Taiwanese Business Groups,” Chiao Da Mangement Review, 28(1), 269-312.
59.Lin, Y. F. (2005). “Corporate Governance, Leadership Structure and CEO Compensation: Evidence from Taiwan,” Corporate Governance: An International Review, 13(6), 824–835.
60.Lins, K. V. (2003). “Equity Ownership and Firm Value in Emerging Markets,” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 38(1), 159-184.
61.McConnell, J. and Servaes, H. (1990), “Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership and Corporate Value,” Journal of Financial Economics, 27(2), 595-612.
62.Meyers, P. W. (1990). “Non-linear Learning in Large Technological Firms: Period Four Implies Chaos,” Research Policy, 19(2), 97-115.
63.Miller, D., Le Breton-Miller, I., Lester, R. H. and Cannella Jr, A. A. (2007). “Are family Firms Really Superior Performers?” Journal of Corporate Finance, 13(5), 829-858.
64.Mitton, T. (2002). “A Cross-firm Analysis of the Impact of Corporate Governance on the East Asian Financial Crisis,” Journal of Financial Economics, 64(2), 215-241.
65.Monks, R. and Minow, N. (1995). Corporate Governance. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers.
66.Morck, R., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. W. (1988). “Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis,” Journal of Financial Economics, 20(1-2), 293-315.
67.Mundlak, Y. (1978). “On the Pooling of Time Series and Cross Section Data,” Econometrica, 46(1), 69-85.
68.Murphy, K. J. (1999). “Executive Compensation,” in Ashenfelter, O. and Card D. eds., Handbook of Labor Economics. New York and Oxford: Elsevier Science North Holland, 2485-2563.
69.Pan, F. W. (2005). The Succession of Taiwam's Family Business-Case Study, Unpublished Master Dissertation, Fu-Jen Catholic University.
70.Patton, A. and Baker, J. C. (1987). “Why Do Not Directors Rock the Boat?” Harvard Business Review, 65(6), 10-12.
71.Portney, L. G. and Watkins, M. P. (2000). Foundations of Clinical Research: Applications to Practice. 2nd ed., NJ: Prentice Hall.
72.Pound, J. (1988). “Proxy Contests and the Efficiency of Shareholder Oversight,” Journal of Financial Economics, 20(1-2), 237-265.
73.Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. W. (1986). “Large Shareholders and Corporate Control,” Journal of Political Economy, 94(3), 461-488.
74.Sue, S. H., Lu, C. J. and Chin, C. L. (2009). “The Association between Family Firms and Earnings Quality: Ownership, Management and Control,” NTU Management Review, 19(2), 35-70.
75.Villalonga, B. and Amit, R. (2006). “How do Family Ownership, Management, and Control Affect Firm Value?” Journal of Financial Economics, 80(2), 385-417.
76.Wasserman, N. (2006). “Stewards, Agents, and the Founder Discount: Executive Compensation in New Venture,” Academy of Management Journal, 49(5), 60-76.
77.White H. (1980). “Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix and a Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity,” Econometrica, 48(4), 817-838.
78.Wiwattanakantang, Y. (2001). “Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Value: Evidence from Thailand,” Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 9(4), 323-362.
79.Yang, Y. H., Lin, Y. H. and Yen, G. F. (2012). “A Study on Efficiency Monitoring and Interest Assimilation in Corporate Governance–Listed Companies in Taiwan,” Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, 48(4), 169-183.
80.Yeh, Y. H. (1999). “Family Groupings, Core Business and Return Interaction: Taiwan and Hong Kong Stock Markets,” Management Review, 18(2), 59-86.
81.Yeh, Y. H. (2005). “Do Controlling Shareholders Enhance Corporate Value?” Corporate Governance: An International Review, 13(2), 313-325.
82.Yeh, Y. H. (1999). “Family Groupings, Core Business and Return Interaction: Taiwan and Hong Kong Stock Markets,” Management Review, 18(2), 59-86.
83.Yeh, Y. H. and Lee, T. S. (2001) “Corporate Governance and Performance: the Case of Taiwan,” The Seventh Asia Pacific Finance Association Annual Conference, Shanghai.
84.Yeh, Y. H., Lee, T. S. and Ko, C. E. (2002). Corporate Governance and Rating Systems. Taipei: Businessnews Publishing.
85.Yeh, Y. H., Lee, T. S. and Woidtke, T. (2001). “Corporate Governance and Performance: the Case of Taiwan,” International Review of Finance, 2(1), 21-48.
86.Yen, G. F. (1996). “A Research on Cultural-Structural Relationship of Taiwan Family Enterprises: The Dual-System Model and Some Related Managerial Problems,” Chung Yuan Journal, 24(4), 1-9.
87.Yen, G. F. and Yang, Y. H. (2012). “Efficiency Monitoring in the Family Enterprises Dual-system Structure – An Empirical Analysis of Taiwan’s Financial Holding Companies,” Academy of Taiwan Business Management Review, 8(2), 80-88.
88.Yen, G. F., Lin, Y. H. and Yang, Y. H. (2012). “Perspective of Convergence-of-Interest Hypothesis in PROCOMP Informatics LTD,” Industry Management Review, 5(2), 57-70.
89.Yen, G. F., Yang, Y. H. and Lin, Y. H. (2013). “Infringement on Interests of Minority Shareholders under Interest Assimilation,” ICIC Express Letters, 7(7), 1991-1995.
 
 
 
 
第一頁 上一頁 下一頁 最後一頁 top
:::
無相關著作
 
無相關點閱
 
QR Code
QRCODE

臺灣人文及社會科學引文索引資料庫

目前上線人數：995（臺灣：966，外國：29） ／ 本年度總使用人次：1780212 ／ 訪客人次（自102年09月）：67585129
國家圖書館著作權聲明 Copyright © 2013 All rights reserved.
本館地址: 100201臺北市中山南路20號． 本館地圖及交通資訊．
總機：(02)23619132．最佳瀏覽解析度為1024x768以上