本文從回應海德格批評胡塞爾對於意向性的理解以及由之侷限於理論的取向出發，深入地探討胡塞爾現象學方法「懸置」的意涵，以論證超驗自我並非為一「無興趣的旁觀者」。 因為針對一般所說的：在從自然態度轉換為超驗態度中關於對象是「什麼」的問題即轉化為關於其是「如何」的問題，本文進一步強調「如何」的問題並不取代「什麼」的問題，現象學根本是經由對於「如何」的一系列的反思，將無限豐富的意義賦予到作為事物本質的「什麼」上去。 我們視這種嶄新的「什麼」猶如一種藝術作品，現象學方法猶如一種藝術活動。這種見解乃從康德在《判斷力批判》裡將美的對象條件歸之於「反思判斷」中得到啟發。 我們見到海德格本真的「現象學心理學」曾為學者視為一種藝術，至於胡塞爾晚期經由對於生活世界與超驗主體的無限反思其「如何」，以最後呈現作為純粹現象學心理學主題的超驗主體本質是「什麼」的豐富意義，故胡塞爾的「現象學心理學」亦為我們視為一種藝術。

This article starts from a reaction on Heidegger’s critiques of Husserl’s conception of the intentionality and his theoretical position, then investigates with greater depth Husserl’s phenomenological method “epoche”, and highlights that the transcendental ego originally is not “an uninterested observer”. For viewing that from the natural to the transcendental attitude the question of “what” is transformed into the question of “how” by no means replaces the question of “what”. Phenomenology basically aims to endow the essence of matter as “what” through a series of reflections on its “how” with boundless meanings. We estimate this new form of “what” as a work of art, and the phenomenological method as an activity of art. This insight is illuminated by Kant when hi in “Critique of Judgment” discusses the possibility of a beautiful object to be obtained through a Reflective Judgment. We see some scholar thinks Heidegger’s authentic phenomenological psychology like an art. The later Husserl shows his mature phenomenological psychology, as he acquires the rich meanings of the essence (“what”) of the transcendental subjectivity as the topics of the pure phenomenological psychology through a series of reflections of the “how” of the Life-world and the transcendental subjectivity. So Husserl’s phenomenological psychology can be understood as a form of art.