中共「十七大」已於2007 年10 月召開。中共「十七大」是胡錦濤全面 掌權的歷史新階段，並決定新一代政治菁英甄補。在本次會議中，新政治菁 英具備何種條件與特色？胡錦濤所支持之共青團派在權力分派過程中扮演何 種角色? 此外，「十七大」進入政治局之新菁英，亦將是觀察2012 年「十八 大」接替胡錦濤領袖地位之重要成員，此皆對未來5 年中國政治發展與政策 取向產生實質影響。 本文在2007 年4 月間，以中共「十六大」中央委員與中央候補委員做 樣本，依據年齡、學歷、留洋資歷、派系、政績表現、中央領導資歷、地方 領導資歷、中央/地方領導資歷、大省(直轄)資歷，以及具代表性意義之族 群、性別與社會科學人才等12 項指標，進行加權調整，預測中共「十七 大」政治菁英甄補。研究結果與實際公佈的中共中央政治局成員頗多雷同， 顯示本研究模型具有一定預測力。 中共「十七大」菁英甄補運作與地方治理將顯現下列趨勢與特質： （一）中共「十七大」新一代領導人將普遍具有地方治理經驗、能力與利 益，政策思維與設想將更具宏觀視野；（二）中央對地方之治理雖強調間接 調控與經濟槓桿之運作，但是人事的直接安排、組織調整與政敵清洗，皆彰 顯中央領導階層仍握有操控地方的實權；（三）中央部門雖因市場改革弱化 控制能力，但持續性宏觀調控槓桿之運作，以及經濟資源的分派，仍將能強 化對地方的掌控；（四）訴求民生與小康社會目標，著重「以人為本」、強調 成長素質、生態維護與區域發展平衡；（五）市場轉型與失調衍生之社會挑 戰日益尖銳，中央部門將以釋放更多資源與福利補償，進行社會安撫與穩定 佈局。

The Chinese Communist Party’s 17 th Congress was held during October 2007, this Congress played important roles on defining political development and major policy issues in the next 5 years. In this paper, we will examine conditions and requirements for cadres to be promoted to power circle, and to evaluate whether cadres with affiliation to Communist Youth League (CYL) might have better chances to get promoted. In addition, elites enter CCP’s Politburo in the 17 th Party Congress will succeed President Hu Jintao as leaders in the 18 th Congress. Conduct our analysis during April 2007, we employed members and alternate members of central committees of the 16 th Party Congress as analytic units to explore factors such as age, education, overseas education, faction, governing performance, experience in central government and/or local government, governing experience in important provinces or metropolitan areas, along with symbolic indicators such as ethnic backgrounds, gender, and social science training for predicting the probability of being recruited to the CCP central committee. Several trends and characteristics can be identified in the eliterecruitment and local governance in the 17 th Party Congress. First, new leaders will be equipped with local governing experience, capability, and interest, so they will have a broader view on their policies. Second, leaders in the central government still control local personnel and marginalize their challengers. Third, market reforms might weaken the dominant roles of the central government, but the central government might still regain its control through resources allocation. Fourth, in order to maintain stable social order, the central government provides more resource on welfare expenditure.