由於經濟相當倚賴海外市場，南韓傳統上對區域貿易協定（regional trade arrangements,簡稱RTA）的態度冷淡，因為RTA對非成員經濟體的產品採取歧視性的待遇。此一政策導向的制訂是假設韓國是個對全球進行貿易的經濟體，而RTA不僅對促進南韓的貿易利益沒有助益，而且可能導致相互排斥的貿易集團出現，傷及多邊貿易體系。因此，南韓加入像亞太經濟合作組織（APEC）這類的區域經濟合作協定以及參與如全球貿易優惠體系（Global System of Trade Preferences,簡稱GSTP）、發展中國家貿易協商（Trade Negotiations among Developing Countries ,簡稱TNDC)、亞太經濟社會委員會的發展中國家（Developing Member Countries of the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific）成員所簽訂的曼谷協定（the Bangkok Agreement）等少數的優惠貿易協定。此外，自2000年以降開始對發展最落後的國家做單方面貿易讓步。不過，直到近期韓國才成為RTA的成員之一。事實上，2004年以前南韓是少數沒有簽自由貿易協定（free trade agreement,簡稱FTA)的世界貿易組織（WTO）的成員國。 正因為如此，盧武鉉政府宣布採取「同時多個FTA談判的策略」，以彌補其在FTA簽署熱潮落後的不利困境。另一方面，在市場自由化上南韓政府採取全面的WTO plus策略（即FTA的內容不限於傳統貿易議題，尚含括其他經濟合作如能源、環境、競爭、貿易便捷化等議題）。由於南韓與主要貿易伙伴的跨境貿易的障礙已相當低，南韓在FTA談判時致力於非關稅問題如貿易補救體系、投資、服務業貿易、智慧財產的保護、與科技合作等。換言之，南韓政府採取了一套獨特的貿易補救體系。

Korea, whose economy relies considerably upon foreign export markets, had traditionally been antipathetic about regional trade arrangements (RTAs) that intrinsically cause discriminatory treatment for products from non-party economies. Such policy tendency has been based on the premise that, as an economy with a global trading exposure, RTAs are not helpful to promote Korea’s trading interests and that these arrangements may lead to mutually exclusive trading blocs which undermine the multilateral trading system. Korea therefore participated in regional economic cooperation arrangements such as APEC and took part in a limited number of preferential tariff arrangements such as the Global System of Trade Preferences (GSTP), Trade Negotiations among Developing Countries (TNDC), the Bangkok Agreement Among Developing Member Countries of the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, and since 2000, unilateral tariff concessions to least developed countries. However, Korea did not become a party to any RTAs such as the free trade area or customs union until recently. Korea indeed remained as a very few WTO Members that did not establish any free trade agreement (FTA) relationship with other countries until 2004. This policy toward RTAs was dramatically changed in the late 1990s when the Korean government recognized that it became isolated from most economic integration initiatives and suffered from trade diversion due to tariff disadvantages. The RTAs are increasingly seen as an effective way of maintaining export markets and for inducing foreign direct investment into Korea. On 5 November 1998, the Committee for Internal Economic Policy Coordination chaired by the Prime Minister determined that the Korean government launched the first FTA negotiation with Chile. It was the first time for the Korean government to formally decide on the FTA policy matters. The Government Report submitted to the Trade Policy Review of Korea in September 2000 clearly denotes the change in policy: As an economy that has benefited greatly from the openness in global trade, Korea has traditionally valued the multilateral trading system and has not supported bilateral or regional free trade agreements. Though its commitment to multilateralism is still firm, Korea has recently begun to be more flexible with regard to the FTAs in the world trading system. Korea is now of the view that FTAs, if properly concluded and managed in accordance with relevant rules, can supplement the multilateral trading system and contribute to market opening in the world through bilateral and regional acceleration of trade liberalization. For the first FTA negotiation, the Korean government established “Korea-Chile FTA Committee” and five working parties on market access, quarantine and standards, investment and service, trade rules, and dispute settlement. On the APEC Summit meeting in September 1999, presidents of both countries agreed to begin the FTA negotiation. Four formal meetings for the FTA negotiation in December 1999, February, May, and December 2000 were held before the FTA negotiation was stalled mainly due to the strong opposition from Korean agricultural sectors. The negotiation appeared a failure after the fifth formal meeting in March 2001 could not be held despite the original schedule. But, at the APEC Summit Meeting in Shanghai in October 2001, two countries agreed to continue the FTA negotiation. Finally, on 24 October 2004, both countries announced the conclusion of a bilateral FTA after the full one week negotiation at Geneva. The FTA was signed on 15 February 2003. But, the last hurdle for the first FTA came from the National Assembly of Korea. When the FTA text was moved to the National Assembly for ratification in October 2003, there was vehement opposition especially from congressmen representing farming sectors. After long battles in the legislative body – especially, after three consecutive failures at the floor voting, the first FTA was ratified on 16 February 2004 only with an enormous subsidy package for farming sectors. This first FTA entered into force on 1 April 2004.????? ??????? There are several reasons why the Korean government chose Chile as the first FTA partner. Firstly, the opposite seasonal environment and the long geographical distance were considered favorable conditions to alleviate agricultural trade and thus problems for domestic agricultural sectors. Secondly, it wanted to have an access to the Chilean market that already established many FTA relationships. Particularly, they thought that the extensive FTA network of Chile in the western hemisphere might work as an important gateway for Korea to get an access to increasingly integrated American markets. In addition, the Korean government thought that the supplementary industry structure of two economies based on traditional comparative advantages would maximize gains from trade incurred by the FTA. Other than those, learning effects from the Chilean FTA experience, sharing similar policy principles for open economies are also noted as relevant factors to choose Chile. Lastly, Chile was one of the few countries that actually showed the willingness to engage in a FTA negotiation with Korea, because most other countries did not take Korea’s offer seriously. The long history of Korea as the strong opponent to RTAs probably made other countries suspicious about the change of the Korean government’s trade policy. As summarized in <Table 1>, after the first “experimental” or “pioneering” FTA, the Korean government aggressively pursued FTA policies. In 2006, two more FTAs entered into force. With these strategically well-dispersed three FTAs, one with Latin American country, one with Asian economy and one with European countries, the Korean government basically finished a “warm-up” stage of FTA policy implementation. It had accumulated divergent experience to deal with not only geographically different countries, but also developed (Singapore), developing (Chile) and a group of countries (EFTA).?? Unlike most other countries in FTA races, the Korean government then moved directly to major trading partners for FTA negotiation. The FTA negotiations followed right after those warm-up FTAs include Japan, the United States, European Union, India and Canada. Also, it is examining the feasibility of FTAs with various countries including the Russia, MERCOSUR, and China.