「總理信任投票機制」乃議會內閣制國家穩定「行政立法互動關係」的機制之一，為達此目標，行政機關被授予一項處理危機之主動權限，並於運作程序中給予聯邦總理、聯邦議會以及聯邦總統三大憲法機關不同的權限與責任，實現憲法機關間相互制衡之目標，建立穩定運作之憲政體系。然本文透過對德意志聯邦共和國建國以來五次信任投票之研究分析，發現實際運作與此制度設計之原意多所出入。詳言之，就德國內閣體制之運作模式與政黨組閣型態而言，一方面此機制只具有短暫性抑制衝突的作用，並無法正面解決行政立法之結構性危機；另一方面則被視為執政黨延續執政與提高自我利益之選戰工具，但這種藉由行使合法權限所產生之政治外溢效果，不但已與當初制憲之原意背道而馳，更可能引起違憲之疑慮，並影響德國議會內閣體制之長久穩定運作。對此，本文認為應針對信任投票之提案時機給予限制，以期讓政治行動者在德國民主憲政秩序的框架下仍舊保有自由裁量空間，使信任投票運作達到穩定政局之實際效用。

The German vote of confidence, which is designed to resolve political gridlock, furnishes executive preemptive power to deal with political conflict and respectively entitles the Chancellor, the Bundestag, and Federal President different institutional prerogatives to counterbalance one another. By analyzing all cases of confidence votes in Federal Germany, this paper uncovers substantial inconsistencies between the intention and the enforcement of such a constitutional design. To begin with, the confidential mechanism, at best, has a short-term effect on curbing the conflict between the legislature and the executive. Moreover, it is often employed to reap electoral benefits, such as prolonging the reign of the Chancellor and gaining more party seats. This abuse has resulted in vast public concerns over the violation of the constitutional and long-term instability of the German parliamentary system. To solve these problems, this paper suggests that some appropriate constraints should be imposed on the timing of proposing a confidence vote. By doing so, a confidence vote can simultaneously leave room for political actors’ discretion and maintain political stability.