私人監測架構下的組織間知識移轉模型__臺灣人文及社會科學引文索引資料庫

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題名：	私人監測架構下的組織間知識移轉模型
書刊名：	亞太經濟管理評論
作者：	陳建華／王俊雄／洪啟嘉
出版日期：	2010
卷期：	14:1
頁次：	頁47-66
主題關鍵詞：	知識移轉；重複賽局；回顧策略；私人監測；Knowledge transfer；Repeated game；Review strategy；Private monitoring
原始連結：	連回原系統網址
相關次數：	被引用次數:期刊(0) 博士論文(0) 專書(0) 專書論文(0) 排除自我引用:0 共同引用:16 點閱:26

許多組織間學習文獻強調，廠商藉由組織間關係（inter-organization relationships，以下簡稱IORs）的互動，是進行組織間學習的重要途徑；不過，這些文獻並未建構一個能使知識有效率移轉的理論模型，特別是在廠商無法監測對手的私人訊號時，該如何擬定知識移轉策略始終付之闕如。因此，藉由賽局理論，找出私人監測架構下的均衡知識移轉策略，將是知識移轉研究建立理論依據的重要課題。本文利用重複賽局架構，建構IORs的知識移轉模型。模型中，我們根據Matsushima (2004)的「回顧階段」建構廠商在私人監測下的知識移轉之策略。本文發現：（一）當對手未通過檢視門檻時，廠商可以利用混合行動而非處罰對手，避免彼此陷入皆不合作的不利結果。（二）回顧策略為長期互動的序貫均衡，廠商可獲得知識移轉的個人理性及效率效用。

以文找文

The studies of inter-organization learning had emphasized that firms could learn knowledge and develop technology through by inter-organization relationships (hereafter IORs). However, these literatures had not constructed a theoretic model under which made knowledge transfer efficiently. In specialty, these literatures failed to find the equilibrium strategy for knowledge transfer in IORs with private signals. Therefore, by the game theory, how to design the knowledge transfer strategies with private monitoring is the most important issue for the studies of inter-organization learning. In this paper, the repeated game theory is applied to establish a kind of IORs knowledge transfer with private monitoring. According to Matsushima (2004), by the review phase, the firms will regularly examine the opponents whether pass the threshold or not and as the reference of adjusting action to the next period. The results show that (1) when the opponents do not pass the threshold, the firms can use the mixing action but not punishment to avoid the unfavorable results from mutually incorporation. (2) Review strategy is the sequential equilibrium in our model and the firms in IORs can get the individually rational and efficient utility.

以文找文

期刊論文
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25.	Gulati, Ranjay(1995)。Does Familiarity Breed Trust? The Implications of Repeated Ties for Contractual Choice in Alliances。The Academy of Management Journal，38(1)，85-112。
26.	Zaheer, Akbar、Venkatraman, Natarjan(1995)。Relational governance as an interorganizational strategy: An empirical test of the role of trust in economic exchange。Strategic Management Journal，16(5)，373-392。
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學位論文
1.	黃延聰(2002)。跨國代工聯盟中產品開發之知識取得與能力發展(博士論文)。國立臺灣大學，臺北。延伸查詢

圖書
1.	Nohria, N.、Eccles, R.(1992)。Networks and Organization: Structure, Form and Action。Boston：Harvard Business School Press。
2.	Bourdieu, Pierre(1986)。The Forms of Social Capital: Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education。Westport, CT。
3.	Fukuyama, F.(1995)。Trust: The Social Values and the Creation of Prosperity。New York：Free Press。
4.	Jacobs, Jane(1965)。The Death and Life of Great American Cities。Penguin Books。
5.	Coleman, James Samuel(1990)。Foundations of social Theory。Belknap Press of Harvard University Press。

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