所謂「營救式刑求」，通常係指為拯救一人或多人之生命，而對他人施加刑求以獲取被害人所在地或炸彈設置地等相關情報之行為。此種行為，即使目的係為了營救他人，仍因其涉及「刑求」之禁忌而長年來成為法學界極度爭議之問題。特別是2001年的911攻擊事件，開啟了美國政府的「反恐戰爭」，並迫使美國政府重新思考「刑求」在其反恐戰爭中之地位以及在其現有法律制度下正當化此行為之可能。在此一背景下，美國司法部的法律顧問局即在其2004年被公開的「Bybee Memo」中，提出了以英美刑法中的「必要性抗辯」來正當化美國執法人員為反恐而可能採取的刑求行為。英美刑法中之必要性抗辯，類似於我國刑法中緊急避難之概念。該抗辯允許行為人為了避免一個較為嚴重的損害的發生，而選擇從事一個損害較為輕微的違法行為。行為人若於其案件中成功的主張了必要性抗辯，則其將不需為其所為之犯罪行為負責。必要性抗辯於1800年代早期即曾於英美文獻中被拿來作為營救式刑求典型案例之假想討論，後更於Bybee Memo中直接被引用作為美國官方正當化刑求之理由之一。然英美刑法中之必要性抗辯到底可不可以適用於營救式刑求？本文即將以此為命題，探討營救式刑求在美國法中之地位，並就英美刑法中之必要性抗辯於營救式刑求之適用加以分析討論。

For centuries, the unequivocal position of the civilized world has been that torture is an abomination, one of the worst violations imaginable of human dignity. Many international agreements prohibit the use of torture in any circumstance. However, are there any circumstances in which a government would be justified in employing torture? If torture were permitted in such situation, how should the law treat the tortures? The famous ticking time-bomb cases invite us to imagine a scenario wherein the torture of one guilty terrorist will lead to the acquisition of information that can be used to save the lives of many innocents. The principal moral question suggested by these cases is whether one harm can be affected such that a worse one is not. While the debate of such cases can date back to the early 1800s, the September 11 attacks in the United States sparked the debate again. After the September 11, the Bush administration was forced to face this difficult question, and the result is a memo prepared by the Justice Department’s office of Legal Counsel. The memo had been known as the ＂torture memo＂ which suggest that criminal law defense of necessity could justify interrogation methods, probably include torture, needed to elicit information to prevent a direct and imminent threat to the U.S. Under the common law, the necessity defense exculpates an actor for conduct that would otherwise be a crime when the actor engages in the conduct in order to prevent something worse from occurring. The memo suggest that the necessity defense will justify a defendant in violation of law when he or she engages in conduct that the actor ＂believes to be necessary to avoid a harm or evil to himself or to another,＂ provided that the ＂harm or evil＂ trying to avoid is greater than that sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense charged. This memo therefore arose controversy among experts in criminal, international, and constitutional law, and forces us to think afresh about the legal prohibition of torture and the justification and purpose of criminal necessity defense. This article will therefore explore the absolute character of the legal and moral prohibitions on torture, and further discuss whether the criminal necessity defense can serve as a justification for torture.