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王元章、陳瑞璽 (2003)，「股權結構、投資支出與公司價值－考慮動態股權結構下之實證研究」，《證券市場發展季刊》，第十五卷，第二期，頁65-100。
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許武利 (2002)，「委託書爭奪戰對股東財富之影響」，國立中山大學財務管理研究所未出版碩士論文。
葉銀華、蘇裕惠、柯承恩與李德冠 (2003)，「公司治理機制對於關係人交易的影響」，《證券市場發展季刊》，第十五卷，第四期，頁69-106。蔡佩怡 (1998)，「委託書收購對股東財富影響的再探討」，輔仁大學金融研究所未出版碩士論文。
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