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題名:綜合銀行、利益衝突、與巿場競爭
作者:陳啟益 引用關係
作者(外文):Chi-Yi Chen
校院名稱:中國文化大學
系所名稱:經濟學研究所
指導教授:江永裕
學位類別:博士
出版日期:2005
主題關鍵詞:範疇經濟利益衝突綜合銀行事業風險專案風險異質廠商證券品質金融業結構Economies of ScopeConflicts of InterestUniversal BankingEnterprise-wide RiskProject-specific RiskHeterogeneous FirmsSecurity QualityStructures of Financial Intermediation
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在綜合性金融機構蔚為風氣之際, 有關金融機構綜合化經營的各項議題, 頓時成為各界討論的焦點。 本論文首先整理既有文獻, 說明金融機構綜合化經營對廠商融資及金融業結構的影響。 其次我們建立兩個理論模型, 討論 (i) 經濟體系中廠商的異質性如何影響金融業結構; 及 (ii) 形成利益衝突的條件、 利益衝突與資本市場證券品質的關係、 及利益衝突如何透過廠商的資金選擇影響金融業結構等。
本論文首先整理當前既有文獻, 說明綜合銀行或商業銀行經營證券業務, 對廠商融資及金融業結構的影響。 有關金融機構綜合化經營的討論, 不外乎強調範疇經濟與利益衝突的取捨。 從資金需求者的角度來看, 綜合性金融機構相對於專業性金融機構的主要優勢, 在於提供多元化的融資選擇。 綜合銀行不僅可以滿足資金需求者在不同階段的資金需求, 由此孕育的長期關係更助於資金需求者以更優惠的條件獲得所須資金。 然而, 伴隨金融服務整合而來的問題, 則是金融機構利用多元化經營, 衍生的各種委託 – 代理問題 (principle - agent problems)。 一方面, 綜合性金融機構的範疇經濟優勢, 使得資金需求廠商在資本市場的融資上, 獲得提高證券售價及降低融資成本等好處。 另一方面, 金融機構綜合性經營所衍生的利益衝突問題, 則影響了投資者對金融機構利害關係廠商的證券評價, 及造成不良品質的投資計畫獲得融通等。 至於在金融業結構方面, 本論文分別從證券市場的不完全競爭, 及金融業務功能兩個觀點切入, 說明綜合性金融機構對市場效率的影響。
在既有文獻的基礎上, 本論文建立一個理論分析架構, 探討在綜合性金融機構享有範疇經濟優勢下, 廠商的風險差異如何影響金融業結構的發展; 藉以分析允許綜合銀行進入資金市場對金融業結構所造成的影響。 我們認為, 在廠商的投資過程中除了面臨影響公司整體營運的事業風險外, 亦須承擔專屬於投資計畫的專案風險。 基於廠商所面臨風險的差異, 各類型金融機構對於廠商取得所須資金的機會與成本, 將影響廠商的融資選擇及金融業結構的決定。 我們發現, 當廠商得知自己的專案風險, 而無從獲悉事業風險類型時, 經濟體系中低事業風險的廠商愈多時, 愈有利於投資銀行的經營; 反之, 對商業銀行的經營愈有利。 隨著低事業風險與高事業風險的廠商數量差距縮小, 經濟環境愈有利於綜合銀行的經營。 此外, 當廠型無從判知自己事業風險及專案風險時, 高成功機率 (即低專案風險) 廠商數目愈多, 對投資銀行的經營愈有利; 反之, 則有利於商業銀行的經營。 然而, 隨著高成功機率與低成功機率 (即高專案風險) 廠商數量差距縮小, 愈有利於綜合銀行的經營。
除了範疇經濟外, 本論文進一步考慮金融機構擴大業務經營所衍生的利益衝突問題。 我們分析形成利益衝突所須具備的條件、 利益衝突與資本市場證券品質的關係、 以及利益衝突如何影響金融業結構等。 首先在形成利益衝突的條件上, 我們發現, 當金融機構承銷廠商證券所須資訊成本相對較低時, 綜合銀行將移轉廠商破產風險形成利益衝突 (即承銷陷入財務困境廠商證券); 反之, 利用利益衝突則不復見。 其次, 在利益衝突與證券品質方面, 我們指出, 當綜合銀行利用利益衝突追求最大利潤時, 確實可能提供資本市場投資者低品質證券。 然而, 利益衝突與低品質證券兩者間並無絕對因果關係, 其癥結在於高資訊成本, 使得綜合銀行從事貸款業務時缺乏動機降低錯誤放款機率, 進而導致過多陷入財務困境的廠商有機會因綜合銀行利用利益衝突, 進入資本市場尋求資金; 反之, 當資訊成本相對較低時, 即使綜合銀行利用利益衝突, 但仍將致力降低錯誤放款機率, 減少財務困境廠商進入資本市場影響證券品質。 在金融業結構方面。 我們認為, 銀行貸款與資本巿場融資的相對吸引力, 最終將影響廠商對於綜合銀行和專業性金融機構的選擇。 對資金需求廠商來說, 由於綜合銀行無論在融資成本或資本市場融資機會皆更甚專業性金融機構, 因此為避免持有貸款相對於資本市場融資所面臨的進一步限制與監督, 廠商將選擇綜合銀行做為所須資金來源。
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