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題名：集團企業組織失敗之研究：代理理論與社會網絡觀點
作者：邱郁仁 引用關係
作者(外文)：Yu-Jen Chiu
校院名稱：國立東華大學
系所名稱：企業管理學系
指導教授：楊國彬
學位類別：博士
出版日期：2014
主題關鍵詞：集團企業；組織失敗；代理理論；社會網絡；風險承擔；Business group；Organizational failure；Agency theory；Social network；Risk-taking
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集團企業之公司治理結構錯綜複雜，所衍生出的治理問題與日俱增，故集團企業已成為當代管理研究中的重要課題。同時在經濟環境持續波動下，組織失敗現象層出不窮，但在管理文獻中並未能獲得如組織績效課題般的同等重視。因此，本論文將藉由兩個實證研究，探討集團企業組織失敗之影響因素。
第一個研究著重於集團企業脈絡效果之探討，透過代理理論與社會網絡觀點，分別探討集團內控制與所有權的整體偏離效果及集團網絡密度如何影響個別分子公司組織失敗。同時驗證集團企業脈絡效果如何調節個別分子公司之偏離效果與網絡中心性對個別分子公司組織失敗的影響。研究結果顯示，集團整體偏離效果會正向影響個別分子公司組織失敗之機率與集團網絡密度會負向影響個別分子公司組織失敗之機率，但個別分子公司之偏離效果與網絡中心性分別對個別分子公司組織失敗之間則不具影響性。若同時考量集團企業脈絡效果時，集團整體偏離效果具有強化個別分子公司偏離效果與個別分子公司組織失敗間正向關係的效果，以及集團網絡密度具有強化個別分子公司網絡中心性與個別分子公司組織失敗間負向關係之效果。
第二個研究承接研究一之結論，由於個別分子公司之偏離效果與網絡中心性對個別分子公司組織失敗之直接影響效果並不明顯，與過去文獻發現明顯悖離。因此，本論文研究二嘗試建構中介模型，進一步解決研究一結論與文獻悖離的研究缺口。研究二以個別分子公司風險承擔為中介變數，同樣透過代理理論與社會網絡觀點，分別探討個別分子公司之偏離效果與網絡中心性如何影響公司風險承擔，進而間接影響個別分子公司組織失敗之機率。另外，研究二也同時驗證集團企業整體偏離與網絡密度，如何調節個別分子公司之偏離效果與網絡中心性對公司風險承擔間的關係，進而間接影響個別分子公司組織失敗的機率。研究結果顯示，集團整體偏離效果與集團網絡密度皆會影響公司風險承擔，進而間接影響個別分子公司組織失敗之機率。另外，集團整體偏離效果具有強化個別分子公司偏離效果與公司風險承擔間正向關係的效果，以及集團網絡密度具有強化個別分子公司網絡中心性與公司風險承擔間負向關係之效果，進而間接影響個別分子公司組織失敗之機率。
本論文嘗試結合代理理論與社會網絡觀點，並綜合考量集團企業脈絡效果與公司風險承擔之中介效果對個別分子公司組織失敗之影響，其研究結果具有重要理論意涵及實務意義。
Business groups, as a sophisticated organizational structure, become even more complex through the problem of corporate governance. Consequently, corporate governance within business groups has been an important research topic among the emerging issues in the management literature. Furthermore, the topic of organizational failure has not received as much attention as that of organizational performance in the management literature. This thesis examines organizational failure in business groups by conducting two empirical studies with related but different focuses.
Study 1 adopts the perspectives of agency theory and social networks and focuses on their contextual effects in business groups. Study 1 also investigates the influence of group-level and firm-level deviation effects of control in excess of ownership, as well as their interaction, on organizational failure. Furthermore, this study investigates the influence of group-level network density and firm-level network centrality, as well as their interaction, on organizational failure. Empirical results demonstrate a positive relationship between group-level macro deviations and organizational failure, but no relationship existed between firm-level deviations and organizational failure; the network density of a business group is negatively associated with organizational failure, but no relationship existed between the firm’s network centrality and organizational failure. The evidence related to cross-level deviation in business groups shows that group-level macro deviations significantly strengthen the positive relationship between the firm-level deviation effect and organizational failure. Cross-level network density in a business group strengthens the negative relationship between the firm’s network centrality and organizational failure.
The second study incorporates the findings of study 1, although this finding is inconsistent with past literature. Therefore, study 2 attempts to build a mediator model. Study 2 empirically re-examines the missing link between the firm-level deviation effect and organizational failure, and it considers the missing link between firm-level network centrality and organizational failure. Study 2 focuses on corporate risk-taking in business groups and comprehensively examines how the firm-level deviation effect and network centrality influence organizational failure through the mediating variables of corporate risk-taking. Furthermore, this study examines how the interaction of group-level and firm-level deviation effects, as well as group-level network density and firm-level network centrality, influence organizational failure through the mediating variables of corporate risk-taking. Empirical results demonstrate that group-level macro deviations significantly strengthen the positive relationship between the firm-level deviation effect and risk-taking to organizational failure. The macro network density in business groups strengthens the negative relationship of a firm’s network centrality and risk-taking to organizational failure.
This thesis integrates the perspectives of agency theory and social networks and aims to interpret their contextual effects in business groups. This study’s findings also bear important implications for both theory and practice.
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