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題名:參與式預算制度對預算寬列傾向影響之實證研究--以任務不確定性及偵測預算寬列能力為調節變數
書刊名:當代會計
作者:倪豐裕 引用關係邱炳乾 引用關係
作者(外文):Ni, Feng-yuChiou, Bing-chyan
出版日期:2000
卷期:1:1
頁次:頁41-54
主題關鍵詞:預算參與任務不確定性預算寬列偵測預算寬列能力交互作用效果Budgetary participationTask uncertaintyBudgetary slackSlack detectionInteraction
原始連結:連回原系統網址new window
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  • 被引用次數被引用次數:期刊(5) 博士論文(2) 專書(0) 專書論文(0)
  • 排除自我引用排除自我引用:5
  • 共同引用共同引用:0
  • 點閱點閱:104
     本研究的目的在探討預算參與與預算寬列傾向的關係,並且以任務不確定性及上司偵測預算寬列能力為情境變數,以解釋過去行為會井對上述關係在實證研究上並一致現象。針對實行預算參與制度的28家上市公司的經理人進行問券調查,並進行多元迴歸分析。研究結果發現預算參與和任務不確定性對預算寬列傾向有顯著的交互作用效果存在。亦即,當任務不確定性高(低)時,預算參與將可增少(增加)預算寬列傾向。並且,本研究進一步發現上述交互作用效果受到偵測預算寬列能力的影響。換言之,預算參與、任務不確定與偵測預算寬列能力對預算寬列存在顯著的三維交互作用效果;高偵測預算寬列能力可強化預算參與在任務不確定下的實質正面效果而降低預算寬列。此研究結果有助於調和過去實證研究的不一致,並且作為企業在實施預算參與制度的參考。
     This study wanted to investigate the relationship between participative budgeting system and budgetary slack. In order to explain the inconsistent empirical results in the previous behavior accounting. This study explore how this relationship affected by the task uncertainty and the budgetary slack detection. We invested 140 middle managers in 28 owner firms, which implement participative budgetary system. Through the regression analysis, we found that there is interaction effect between budgetary participation and task uncertainty on budgetary slack, and the direction also meet the expectation of hypothesis. This is, when task uncertainty is high (low), budgetary participation will decrease (increase) the propensity of budgetary slack. Further, we also found the significant three ways interaction effect including slack detection on budgetary slack. By this results, we could reconcile the inconsistency existing previous behavior accounting researches and provide some practical suggestion.
Other
1.Dunk, A. S.(1993)。The Effect of Budget Emphasis and Information Asymmetry on the Relation Between Budgetary Participation and Slack。  new window
2.Chong. V. K.(1996)。Management Accounting Systems, Task Uncertainty and Managerial Performance: A Research Note。  new window
期刊論文
1.Baiman, S.、Lewis, B. L.(1989)。An Experiment Testing the Behavioral Equivalence of Strategically Equivalent Employment Contracts。Journal of Accounting Research,27,1-20。  new window
2.Nouri, H.(1994)。Using Organizational Commitment and Job Involvement to Predict Budgetary Slack: A Research Note。Accounting, Organizations and Society,19(3),289-295。  new window
3.Erez, M.、Arad, R.(1986)。Participative Goal Setting: Social, Motivational and Cognitive Factors。Journal of Applied Psychology,71(4),591-597。  new window
4.Meyer, H. H.、Kay, E.、French, J. R. P. , Jr.(196501-)。Split Roles in Performance Appraisal。Harvard Business Review,44(3),123-129。  new window
5.Onsi, M.(1973)。Factor Analysis of Behavioral Variables Affecting Budgetary Slack。The Accounting Review,48(3),535-548。  new window
6.Van de Ven, A. H.、Delbecq, A. L.(1974)。A task contingent model of work-unit structure。Administrative Science Quarterly,19(2),183-197。  new window
7.Young, S. M.(1985)。Participative Budgeting: The Effects of Risk Aversion and Asymmetric Information on Budgetary Slack。Journal of Accounting Research,23(2),829-842。  new window
8.Merchant, K. A.(1981)。The Design of the Corporate Budgeting System: Influences on Managerial Behavior and Performance。The Accounting Review,56(4),813-829。  new window
9.Schiff, M.、Lewin, A. Y.(196805)。Where Traditional Budgeting Fails。Financial Executive,36,51-62。  new window
圖書
1.Hopwood, A. G.(1976)。Accounting and Human Behaviour。Englewood Cliffs, NJ:Prentice Hall。  new window
2.Bodnar, G. H.、Hopwood, W. S.(1998)。Accounting Information Systems。New Jersey:Prentice-Hall Inc.。  new window
3.Jaccard, J.、Turrisi, R.、Wan, C. K.(1990)。Interaction Effects in Multiple Regression。Newbury Park, California。  new window
其他
1.Baiman, S.(1982)。Agency Research in Managerial Accounting: A Second Look。  new window
2.Bishop, R. A.(1991)。Incentive, Moral Hazard, and Risk Aversion: Intrafirm Resource Allcoation and Determinants of Budgetary Slack。  new window
3.Brownell, P.(1982)。Participation in Budgeting Process: When It Works and When It Doesn't。  new window
4.Cammann, C.(1976)。ffects of the Use Of Control System。  new window
5.Chow, C. W. , Cooper, J. C. and Haddad, K.(1991)。The Effects of Schemes and Ratchets on Budgetary Slack and Performance: A Multiperiod Experiment。  new window
6.Collins, F.(1978)。The Interaction of Budgeting Characteristics and Personality Variables with Budgetary Response Attitudes。  new window
7.Dermer, J. D.(1975)。The Interrelationship of Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation。  new window
8.Dunk A. S. & H. Perera(1997)。The Incidence of Budgetary Slack: a Field Study Exploration。  new window
9.Govindarajan, V.(1986)。Impact of Participation in the Budgetary Process on Managerial Attitudes and Performance: Universalistic and Contingency Perspectives。  new window
10.Greenberg, P. S., Greenberg, R. H. and H. Nouri(1994)。Participative Budgeting: A Meta-Analytic Examination of MwthodologicalModerators。  new window
11.Hackman, J. R. and L. W. Porter(1968)。Expectancy Theory Predictions of Work Effectiveness。  new window
12.Hirst, M. K.(1981)。Accounting Information and the Evaluation of Subordinate Performance: A Situational Approach。  new window
13.Hirst, M. K.(1987)。The Effect of Setting Budget Goals and Task Uncertainty on Performance: A Theoretical Analysis。  new window
14.Jennergren, L. P.(1980)。On The Design of Incentives in Business Firms - A Survey of Some Research。  new window
15.Kren, L.(1992)。Budgetary Participation and Managerial Performance: The Impact of Information and Environmental Volitility。  new window
16.Lukka, K.(1988)。Budgetary Biasing in Organizations: Theoretical Framework and Emperical Evidence。  new window
17.Merchant, K. A.(1985)。Budgeting and Propensity to Create Budgetary Slack。  new window
18.Robbins, S. P.(1993)。Organizational Behaviour。  new window
19.Schiff, M. and A.Y. Lewin(1970)。The Impact of People on Bedgets。  new window
20.Schoonhoven, C. B.(1981)。Problems With Contingent Theory: Testing Assumptions Hidden within the Language Of Contingency Theory。  new window
21.Waller, W. S.(1987)。Slack in Participatice Budgeting: The Joint Effect of a Truth-Inducing Pay Scheme and Risk Preferences。  new window
 
 
 
 
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