法哲學的核心爭議是回答關於「法律是什麼」的法概念論爭議，而法概念論最關心的一個主要議題，是有關法律規範性的證立問題。在法哲學的論述中，法哲學家對於法律規範性的證立基礎有相當分歧的看法。大致來說，主要有三種不同論證，分別是道德論證、實效論證、與身分論證。針對這三種法律規範性論誰，英國法哲學家H.L.A. Hart提出「接受」的主張分別予以反駁。他認為法律是一種規 則，而法律規則的規範效力來自兩種接受：一般人民對法律身份的普遍接受，以及法律官員對鑑別有效法律規則之基礎承認規則的官方接受。此外，他更進一步主張，對法律規則的接受不必然是一種道德上的接受。本文除了嘗試檢討潛藏於Hart接受論誰中的四個重要問題外，同時亦試圖提出與其主張完全不同的結論，那就是:對於法律規則的接受，不可能不是一種道德上的接受。

The core issue of legal philosophy that lies at the center of the very theory of the concept of law is to answer the question about what the law is. And one of the main themes a theory of the concept of law concept is to justify the normative character of law. In the discourse of legal philosophy, legal philosophers have quite diverse versions as to the justification of law's normativity. There are, roughly speaking, three different arguments: the moral argument, the efficacy argument, and the membership argument. H. L.A. Hart, the British legal philosopher, proposes the ‘acceptance' argument to refute these versions of legal normativity. He argues that law is a matter of rules and that the normative force of legal rules depends on the ordinary citizens' general acceptance of law's membership and the legal officials' acceptance of a fundamental rule of recognition as the master test to identify valid legal rules. In addition, He also c1aimsthat the acceptance of legal rules is not necessarily a moral acceptance. This essay not only tries to review four important questions immanent in Hart's acceptance thesis, but also intends to argue a different conc1usion. That is, it is impossible for the acceptance of legal rules not to be a moral acceptance.