自1987年村委會組織法通過，中國的農村基層選舉，便如火如荼的遍地展開，即便制度和實踐上仍漏洞百出，但民主參與的價值已逐步在村民間散播，其地方統治的形式，也發生潛移默化的轉變。相較行之多年的村委選舉，城市的居民委員會選舉，無論在制度規範、居民參與等各層面，均遠遠遜色，那麼從「村委會」改制為「居委會」的原因究竟何在？看似簡單清楚的現代化、城市化過程，背後是否隱藏著政治動機？此即本文探索的關鍵。因此，本研究的重心在於中國「地方菁英」及「基層自治」間的相互關係，特別突顯新制度採行所造成的政治僵局，藉以探討「村改居」此類制度變遷的原因。首先，在分析村委會選舉的效應後，吾人發現，若統治結構不變，則基層「村—鄉／鎮兩級關係」及「村—黨兩委關係」間的政治僵局將極易產生，即便透過更換當事雙方，也無法徹底化解此類僵局，釜底抽薪之道在進行村改居的改制。換言之，村改居的制度變遷乃出於地方菁英為化解「基層民意」與「上層黨意」的結構衝突，所因而設計的制度回應之道。但卻因此規避村委選舉所產生的制度約束，造成民主化的倒退。換言之，本研究將透過制 度變遷理論來觀察中國大陸的基層治理，試圖經由改制過程與西方的制度變遷理論對話，參照中國政治發展的經驗，發掘不同於西方發展經驗的理論模型。

Once “Villager’s Committee Organization Law” was formulated in 1987, village elections have been spreading every since. Although these local elections still leave much to be desired, they have made significant progresses in the past years. Also as institutionalized form of political participation, however, elections in cities—for Residents’ Committee—are far worse than those in the countryside—for Villagers’ Committee. Then, what does it mean when a Village Committee turns into a Residents’\r Committee? Is it simply an adjustment due to the course of urbanization? In the study, I try to explain this institutional change in light of the pressures and incentives of local elites, especially the deadlocks these elite face after village elections. As argues in the paper, shifting from Villagers’ Committees to Residents’ Committees is almost the only way to avoid the pressures of village elections and solve the above-mentioned deadlock. China’s local elites are thus encouraged to initiate this institutional change. The consequence is then a step falling back on China’s way toward grassroots democratization.