董事與監察人對公司債權人究竟負有何種義務為本文討論之核心，其中特別以公司面臨財務困難時，其對債權人所負義務為重點。我國公司法雖規定董事應於公司資產顯不足抵償其所負債務時應聲請宣告破產，然違反之法律效果則由民法第三十五條予以補充規定。此制與歐陸如德、法等國相同。 與此體制相對者，如英國及大英國協之部分國家。其不以董事應聲請宣告破產為念，而是以不法交易繩之。尊重董事依公司所處情境做出最有利於公司及債權人之決定，若有違反，則透過一個集體機制命董事負責。此外，另有詐欺交易之民刑責任佐之。 二者之規範理念不同，而得行使權利之主體亦大相逕庭。採強制聲請宣告破產制者由債權人個人起訴；但不法交易則由破產管理人或其他法律規定之人為全體無擔保債權人之利益而聲請。不法交易延續一貫之理念－即董事不對個別債權人負有直接義務，但強制聲請宣告則似與忠實義務無涉。我國董事之忠實義務與民法上強制聲請宣告併存，即易造成體系之矛盾。 再者，債務清理法草案中另課予董事補足之責，如其係仿外國立法例，似有半套之嫌，且更加重原已存在之體系衝突。 本文建議以不法交易為主，重新設計債務清理法之補足規定，並重思民法強制聲請宣告破產之賠償規定有無存在之必要，俾使我國在董監對債權人責任之論述上有其一貫之條理。

The core of this paper is to analyze directors' and supervisors' liabilities to creditors when a company is on the verge of insolvency. Taiwan's Civil Code (Article 35) imposes a compulsory insolvency filing obligation on corporate directors. As a result, when a company is unable to pay its debts and its directors do not act immediately to file the insolvency application, creditors are entitled to sue those directors for the shortfall between the amount originally available to be distributed to them (at the time of filing the application for insolvency) and the amount finally paid based on the insolvency procedure. By contrast, the U.K. and some commonwealth countries adopt a different approach to dealing with the same situation. Directors are not obliged to file an application for insolvency when the company is on the verge of insolvency. Instead, if directors knew or ought to have concluded that there was no reasonable prospect of the company avoiding going into insolvent liquidation, yet did not take every step to minimize the potential loss to corporate creditors, then those directors will be liable. Thus, wrongful trading and fraudulent transactions constitute the framework of the creditor protection. The directors are trusted to make a good faith decision. Accordingly, the way creditors exercise their rights to claim damages from directors is also different. Under the compulsory insolvency filing system, creditors have personal cause to take action against directors. However, based on wrongful trading, creditors may only seek compensation from directors via liquidators. This reveals the nature of the directors' fiduciary duties, i.e., to whom they owe the duties, and to what extent the duties should be performed. Taiwan's new Insolvency Law is in its final stages. In viewing the draft, we see the shadow of wrongful trading together with quite a few misunderstandings of foreign laws, and thus some theoretical contradictions among the Civil Code, the Company Law and the draft Insolvency Law are quite apparent. This paper intends to solve this problem and concludes with suggestions for legislation. It suggests that we should abolish the obligation imposed by the Civil Code and then restructure the fiduciary duties of directors and supervisors towards creditors when the company is facing financial difficulties. From that, the British legislation can certainly provide some insights.