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題名:董監事異常變動、家族企業與企業舞弊之關聯性
書刊名:會計評論
作者:林嬋娟 引用關係張哲嘉 引用關係
作者(外文):Lin, Chan-janeChang, Che-chia
出版日期:2009
卷期:48
頁次:頁1-33
主題關鍵詞:企業舞弊公司治理董監事異常變動家族企業FraudCorporate governanceBoard changeFamily firm
原始連結:連回原系統網址new window
相關次數:
  • 被引用次數被引用次數:期刊(62) 博士論文(1) 專書(0) 專書論文(3)
  • 排除自我引用排除自我引用:60
  • 共同引用共同引用:51
  • 點閱點閱:116
本文就我國企業舞弊案件提供較全面而非個案分析的實證研究,並探討公司治理機制與舞弊發生機率間的關係。在考量我國公司治理的獨特背景後,本文就董監事異常變動(未到任期屆滿便辭職)與家族企業發展相關研究假說。實證結果顯示,相較於非舞弊公司,舞弊公司董監事席次異常變動比例顯著較高,且異常變動比例與舞弊發生機率的正向關聯性主要來自於家族企業。而在家族企業方面,相對於非家族企業,家族企業發生舞弊的機率顯著較低,此似乎隱含我國家族企業的利益結合效果大於侵略效果。有別於過去文獻,本文發現外部董監事比例較無法捕捉我國公司治理與企業舞弊之關聯性,董監事異常變動反而是觀察企業舞弊時重要的公司治理指標。
This paper provides a comprehensive analysis about fraud firms in Taiwan and empirically investigates the relation between corporate governance and fraud occurrence. Considering the characteristics of corporate governance in Taiwan, this paper develops hypotheses relating abnormal change of board members and family firms to the likelihood of fraud. Empirical results show that there is positive association between unexpected change of board members and the probability of fraud. Further, the above positive relation exists mainly in family firms. This paper also shows that family firms alone are less likely to be involved in fraud than non-family firms. The result implies that alignment effect of family firms is dominant in Taiwan's capital market. This paper contributes to the literature by providing the evidence that unexpected change of board members, rather than the percentage of outside board members, may be regarded as an important governance indicator to fraud occurrence.
期刊論文
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會議論文
1.金成隆、呂倩如、蘇淑慧。家族公司與盈餘品質關係之研究:所有權、管理權與控制權。new window  延伸查詢new window
研究報告
1.Chan, L.、Chen, T.、Janakiraman, S.、Radhakrishnan, S.。A Note on the Joint Determination of Audit and Non-audit Fees。Richardson, TX。  new window
2.Chi, W. C.、Hsu, C. Y.、Lin, W. Y.。Board Effectiveness: Investigating Payment Asymmetry between Board Members and Shareholders。Taipei。  new window
3.Larcker, D. F.、Rusticus, T. O.。On the Use of Instrumental Variables in Accounting Research。  new window
4.Wang, T. Y.(2006)。Real Investment and Corporate Securities Fraud。Carlson School of Management, University of Minnesota。  new window
5.Wang, H. D.、Lin., C. J.(2008)。Is the Control-ownership Deviation Always "Parasites"? Evidence from Family Firms and Earnings Management。  new window
圖書
1.Beasley, M. S.、Carcello, J. V.、Hermanson, . R.。Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 1987-1997, an Analysis of U.S. Public Companies。Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 1987-1997, an Analysis of U.S. Public Companies。New York, NY。  new window
2.Maddala, G. S.。Introduction to Econometrics。Introduction to Econometrics。New York, NY。  new window
其他
1.Business Roundtable。Statement on Corporate Governance。  new window
 
 
 
 
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