我國公司法對於股份有限公司中股東表決權之分配，基於股東平等原則，係採取－股－表決權原則。雖然公司法例外地容許公司得發行表決權特別股，但在同時，主管機關與學說對於其發行類型，均採取限縮性解釋。惟本文對此現狀，參酌美日法制後，提出以下幾點質疑。 首先，本文肯認－股－表決權原則確實有其合理性，但強調僅以股東平等原則作為其具有強行法規性之論據，似乎稍嫌薄弱。再者，從公司與投資人之需求而言，實有必要鬆綁現行法之規範方式。至於，應如何為之？本文建議，可參考日本公司法以公司之屬性而作不同規範之作法，亦即於閉鎖性公司之情形，完全劃歸章程自治之範疇，而非閉鎖性公司之情形，基本上遵守－股－表決權原則，例外得發行表決權特別股。並且，因非閉鎖性公司存在著股東集合行為以及戰略性選擇問題，如對於表決權特別股之發行，未課予任何限制，則有可能侵害原有股東或投資人之利益。因此，本文認為，於非閉鎖性公司之情形，似可透過自律組織，例如台灣證券交易所，於發行之際，對其內容進行實質審查。

As to the issue of the distribution of shareholders' voting rights, Taiwan's law adopts the principle of the ”one share one vote” in regulating stock corporations. Although the current law in Taiwan also allows stock corporations to issue class stocks, which recognizes the unequal voting rights of shareholders, the types of class stocks are limited due to the interpretation of the authorities concerned and the scholars' opinions. This article challenges this mainstream ideas by invoking the experiences of American and Japanese laws in tackling the issue. First of all, this article supports the rationality of ”one share one vote”, but thinks that only the principle of the equal protection in shareholders is not strong enough to be a mandatory provision. Additionally, it needs to deregulate the relevant laws in the light of the needs of corporations and investors. This article proposes that it is worthy of adopting the Japanese model: i.e., using different regulations to deal with different corporations. As to close companies, this matter belongs to the field of autonomy of company. As to public companies, it should maintain the principle of ”one share one vote”, but it also should allow the class stocks of unequal voting rights. However, because of collective action problems and strategic choice problems in public companies, it should impose some limits on the issue of class stocks to protect shareholders and investors. Further, this article also proposes that it should be done by the self-regulating organization, i.e., TWSE.