近年來國外雖已有專利聯盟相關研究，但大多集中在電子產業，我國目前也沒有生技產業專利聯盟出現。本研究以美國、歐盟、日本之專利聯盟制度與我國做比較，設計出適合我國中草藥專利聯盟之管理機制，以中草藥專利聯盟管理委員會為基本架構，進一步依業務類型分為人事、財務、行銷、智財管理以及法務共五個群組，其下再分部作更細微的分工。在明確的組織架構下，便能達到創造、推廣、應用和保護專利聯盟成員之智慧財產權，並建立聯盟成員間技術交流之平台，實現資源共享的目標。本研究以現行中草藥資料庫所得之專利，依用途分為皮膚類、心血管類、抗氧化類、抗癌、肝膽類、治療截癱、肺、記憶力、腎等共24 類。透過假設產品之方法，依照產品所要解決之症狀，從24 種用途別中找出所需專利並作組合，透過聯盟授權平台取得一次性授權，降低授權談判成本，達到整合並活絡中草藥相關專利之目的。從各國及我國對於專利聯盟之規範，可以發現其不必然違反公平交易法，由於專利聯盟常引發之行為包括聯合行為、獨占濫用行為、搭售等行為，可能產生限制競爭或不公平競爭行為而有權利濫用之虞，專利聯盟是否造成限制競爭及不公平競爭必須從專利聯盟之組織行為、架構、運作方式、功能等來判斷。而我國除了有公平交易法之規定外，公平交易委員會亦訂定技術授權協議案件之處理原則，將授權約款類型加以分類，明確定出不違反、違反、可能違反公平交易法事項之具體例示。由於此處理原則並未對專利聯盟作特別規定，僅於符合處理原則之類型才有適用之可能，如能參考如歐盟、日本制訂專屬於專利聯盟之處理原則，在該原則中釐清專利聯盟之概念以及評估原則，將有助於專利聯盟之運作，且能吸引更多人運用專利聯盟，達到資源整合之目的，促進競爭之效益。

The proposed “plurilateral” Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA)intends to effectively “re-balance” the rights between intellectual property right (hereinafter as IPR) owners and consumers, as copyright, trademark and even patent holders believe. Yet, once the ACTA goes too far, the multinationals who wish for a double windfall, may be disappointed later when the adverse outcomes follow contrary to their expectations. More specifically, the criminal enforcement provision in the earlier leaked text of the ACTA, makes it clear that the Japan - U.S. joint proposal would like the ACTA to go well beyond cases of commercial counterfeiting and piracy. Arguably, non-commercial activities that take place through internet distribution and information technology such as peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing would be captured by this provision, which would likely result in unprecedented impacts to an information society in two aspects. First, such proposed ACTA would be inconsistent with Article 61 of the TRIPS Agreement, or, more accurately, has expanded the scope of the TRIPS Agreement; in addition to the clash with the TRIPS Agreement, the ACTA would contradict the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA) and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) as well, owing to the omission of subpoena provisions that protect ISPs from liability of privacy violations. Second, the imposition of criminal sanctions in cases of IP infringements would highly possibly to bring about thefallouts of anti-innovation and anti-competition and thus may not turn out as the ACTA purported, rather, such approach would conversely encourage motivation to piracy and counterfeiting conducts, arising from market forces. As a convincing rebuttal against the criminal enforcement provision in the proposed ACTA, Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf’s empirical study found that illegal music downloads have had no noticeable effects on the sale of music, contrary to the claims of the recording industry. Stated another way, over-strict criminal sanctions on non-commercial file-sharing users should not be the way to effectively deter infringement; instead, while prosecutions will not stop illegal file trading altogether, what IPR owners need to do, economically, is to reduce infringement enough that they can make a return on their investment. Therefore, this article aims to provide a new paradigm that both re-allocates the marginal costs inherent in the production and distribution of digital content, and lowers enforcement costs burdened on IPR owners, to maintain the equilibrium of IPR holders and the general public.