傳統之代位訴訟具有損害回復、抑制違法行為及健全經營等多重目的。由於股東提起代位訴訟時，其所代位行使者為公司對於違法董事或監察人之權利，自應先向公司請求提起訴訟，而公司拒絕提起時，始得為之。因此，法院認為公司為實質當事人，股東勝訴時，其利益應歸於公司所有，而非股東。隨著企業集團化之發展，美國司法實務所承認之二重代位訴訟，應屬股東跨越行使股東權之適例。就二重代位訴訟而言，控制公司股東雖未持有從屬公司之股份，但仍得代位從屬公司對其違法董事提起訴訟，以確保控制公司之投資利益。美國學界及司法實務上對於是否應承認二重代位訴訟已爭執百年，部分法院通常雖以原告股東不具備同時持股要件而駁回訴訟，但許多法院則嘗試構建二重代位之理論基礎，承認其合法性。本文首先比較一般代位訴訟與二重代位訴訟之差異，並論述二重代位訴訟之基本功能。其次，則分析美國提起二重代位訴訟所應具備之基本要件。再者，除釐清二重代位訴訟之理論與實務爭議外，並檢驗二重代位訴訟之功過。此外，探討我國引進二重代位訴訟時，除思考立法政策與實體法上之問題外，亦應兼顧我國司法程序運作之可能性。最後，則以強化關係企業之治理為基礎，論述我國引進二重代位訴訟制度之可行性。

A traditional derivative action has purposes: compensation, deterrence and soundness. The suit is derivative in the sense that the stockholder initiates the suit on behalf of the corporation to assert legal rights and to deter possible wrongdoing of directors and supervisors. A shareholder can only bring a derivative action in cases in which the corporation has itself failed or refused to take action. Therefore, courts consider the corporation the real plaintiff in derivative suits, and the corporation receives any recovery, not the shareholder. Following the development of corporate groups, the double derivative action is probably the most common and well-settled example of pass-through shareholder rights. In a double derivative action, shareholders of a parent corporation may sue on behalf of a subsidiary of the parent, despite their lack of direct ownership in the subsidiary. In United States, academic scholars and courts have discussed the validity of the double derivative actions almost over one hundred years. Some courts that have rejected double derivative actions because the plaintiffs did not meet contemporaneous ownership requirements. However, most courts have articulated varied theories to justify double derivative actions.First, this paper will briefly compare the differences of derivative action and double derivative action. Next, this paper will discuss the main function of double derivative action. Part Ⅲ of this paper analyzes the fundamental requirements for the shareholders of parent company to bring a double derivative action in United States. Part Ⅳ will clarify the theoretical bases for permitting or denying a double derivative action, and examine the advantages and disadvantages of double derivative actions. Part Ⅴ then critiques the most significant controversies surrounding double derivative actions, from the views both of substantive law and procedural law. Finally, this paper suggests that policymakers should introduce double derivative actions bases for the fiduciary theory and the rational for improving governance of affiliated companies.