本研究從「委託－代理人理論」(principal-agent theory)分析中國大陸城市基層社區「國家與社會」互動。以此理論作為構築社區中各行為者行動取向的分析框架，並透過社區權力的互動，解釋影響治理制度轉變的微觀動力。綜觀當前中國大陸城市基層研究，對於探討直接選舉後社區治理影響的相關文獻仍有空缺，本文從選後的社區治理入手，以居民委員會為論述核心，探討直選的「屬地化」政策對選後社區治理的影響。由於屬地化強調社區的「在地經營」，有助於打破過去社區幹部由上級指派、偏向政府利益的行動策略。因此，社區選舉制度改革引發的政治效果，以及影響治理政策的社會力量，將對中國大陸的治理改革具有重要意義。

This paper focuses on local governance's institutional effects in urban China and takes the principal-agent theory as the analysis framework for illustrating the interaction between state and society. Most research on this issue mainly stresses on the political reform of Residential Committees' [RC] direct elections and how to rationalize the state-society relationship in local governance in modern China, but do not study what local governance is like after the direct elections. Before promoting the policies of direct elections and cadre localization, RC cadres were assigned to manage local communities by the Street Office, that means RC cadres were the agents of the state and act according to orders of superiors. After the implementation of reform policies, citizens have rights to affect RC cadres. In theory, both state and citizens are the principals of RC cadres. The cadre localization policy narrows the gap between RC cadres and citizens, and not only changes the cadres' attitude toward citizens but also reduces the patron-client relationship with the Street Office. Otherwise, the institutional mechanism causes two unintended consequences between state and society which are ”interest divergent” and ”oversight gap.” This study shows that citizens in China yearn for more political rights, and the more politically representative the RCs are, the better governance efficiency will be.