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題名:總經理薪酬與績效衡量及不確定性之配適度對公司營運績效的影響
書刊名:組織與管理
作者:李佳玲 引用關係史雅男 引用關係蔡宜伶
作者(外文):Lee, Chia-lingShih, Ya-nanTsai, Yi-ling
出版日期:2011
卷期:4:2
頁次:39-77
主題關鍵詞:薪酬不確定性績效衡量CompensationUncertaintyPerformance measures
原始連結:連回原系統網址new window
相關次數:
  • 被引用次數被引用次數:期刊(7) 博士論文(0) 專書(0) 專書論文(0)
  • 排除自我引用排除自我引用:7
  • 共同引用共同引用:11
  • 點閱點閱:50
代理理論主張,總經理薪酬應與經營績效連結,並且應考量影響公司經營績效的不確定性因素。依循情境理論,總經理薪酬之決定愈符合情境因素時,公司營運績效應愈好,但過去在此方面的研究甚少,本研究依循此一觀點,探討總經理薪酬、績效衡量及公司面臨之不確定性間的配適程度與公司管連績效是否為正相關。本研究以整合性的觀點來捕捉不確定性,包括盈餘雜訊、股票報酬風險與營運風險,而績效衡量指標則包括會計績效與非會計績效衡量指標。本研究以台灣證券交易所公開上市(櫃)公司為研究對象,實證結果發現,當總經理薪酬與公司面臨之不確定性因素及績效衡量之配適度愈好時,公司營運績效表現愈好。若為配適度不佳者,包括總經理薪酬給付不足或給付過多,均有損於公司營運績效。
Agency theory advocates that CEO compensation should tie to firm performance to better align managers' and shareholders' interests. The factor of uncertainty can not be neglected in determining CEO compensation. Following contingency theory, firm performance should be higher when contextual factors and compensation are aligned than when they are not. Prior research pays little attention to this issue. This study fills this gap to probes that firm performance is superior when CEO compensation is more aligned with performance measures and uncertainty factors. Uncertainty factors are captured by noise in earnings, risk of stock return and operating risk. The performance measures are measured through accounting and non-accounting performance measures.The research samples aim at listed firms in the Taiwan Stock Exchange and OTC stock exchange. The empirical results indicate the greater the alignment between CEO compensation, performance measures and uncertainty factors, the better firm performance consequence is. The firms with worse alignment, including CEO overpayment and CEO underpayment, would get less performance.
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